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1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Focus 
Vietnam has been a vibrant part of the world economy since opening up in 1986, becoming 
an official member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in early 2007. This result is 
something of a sanction of a long process of trade reform and global integration. Indeed, 
Vietnam has strongly embarked on the trade liberalization process through involvement in 
many bilateral and multilateral agreements.  
Vietnam’s further economic integration simultaneously brings about benefits, opportunities 
and important challenges. For instance, this episode provides access to markets and helps to 
develop products in which Vietnam has comparative advantage. However, integration also 
presents new challenges for domestic industries in terms of facing difficulties in adjusting to the 
pressure of growing competition.  
According to traditional trade theory, Vietnam’s international integration may lead to trade 
expansion, labor market adjustments, accelerated technological innovation, efficiency gains and 
growth (Ernst, 2005). Furthermore, during the period of being a WTO member candidate, 
Vietnam had been required to establish a set of norms and institutions supporting the 
liberalization of markets and promoting the rule of law, contract enforcement and the evolution 
of an independent judicial system (Dordi et al., 2008). Additionally, implementing the 
commitments of the WTO can force Vietnam to improve its investment climate, subsequently 
rendering the predictability, security and transparency of market access for all economic sectors. 
This dissertation therefore centers on the following key issues. First, what are the impacts of 
trade liberalization on employment and wages in Vietnamese manufacturing? Second, what 
determines productivity in Vietnamese manufacturing: the roles of technology and institutions? 
Third, what are the constraints of the investment climate on Vietnamese manufacturing technical 
2 
efficiency?
1
 Towards such purposes, various econometric techniques are applied and different 
types of datasets used to investigate the impacts of trade liberalization and institutional reforms 
implemented in Vietnam on manufacturing industries in terms of employment and wage 
responses and firm productive performance. 
1.2 Research Structure and Results  
The dissertation is structured as follows: Chapter 2 investigates how labor markets respond 
to trade liberalization. Chapter 3 considers the impacts of technological and institutional factors 
on firm productive performance, furthermore emphasizing the importance of the institutional 
environment in which enterprises operate on firm performance, serving as a gateway for the 
next chapter. Chapter 4 then analyzes the relationship between the quality of institutions and 
firm technical efficiency in greater detail, before Chapter 5 summarizes the results and 
concludes.  
Chapter 2 is a joint work with Pham Thi Bich Ngoc and Holger Görg, using panel datasets 
at industry and firm levels for manufacturing sectors during 2003-2008, from the Vietnamese 
General Statistics Office (GSO) and Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA)’s 
small and medium enterprise (SME) surveys. This analysis is expected to provide the first 
comprehensive evidence on the labor market adjustments to trade liberalization and the 
distributive impact of this process in Vietnam.  
We incorporate the approaches of Revenga (1997) and Ghazali (2011), which allow trade 
protection variables such as tariffs, quotas on output and inputs, custom duties to imports, and 
effective rate of protection (ERP) to achieve a direct effect on wages and employment at 
industry level, and an indirect impact at firm level. Methodologically, we use many types of 
estimations, the most important method of which applies trade policy variables, i.e. ERP and 
import penetration, as instruments for the endogenous independent variables, i.e. output and 
quasi rents. Overall, we find that trade liberalization has a negative effect on employment and 
wages. The approach on quasi rents further enables us to indicate heterogeneity in bargaining 
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The research focuses on manufacturing industries due to the two main reasons. The manufacturing industries 
contribute the largest share to Vietnam’s GDP growth. And different from the other sectors, Vietnamese 
manufacturing is mostly affected by international integration owing to its export-oriented characteristics. 
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power across firms by gender and skill composition. A firm with a greater fraction of unskilled 
(production) or female workers shows a lower ability of workers to capture part of the quasi 
rents. These findings provide evidence for gender and skill earnings differentials within 
Vietnamese manufacturing. Furthermore, trade liberalization appears to reduce these earnings 
gaps, as in line with Ghazali (2011) for the cases of Tunisia. Additionally, trade unions and 
collective agreements seem to have a role in reducing the skill earning differentials. The 
analysis is in favor of a flexible model of wage setting that accommodates both the existence of 
rent sharing behavior and competitive wage determination.  
Chapter 3 applies a Cobb-Douglas-type production to examine the impact of technological 
and institutional factors on firm performance, using firm level cross-section data collected in 
Vietnam as part of the 2009 World Bank Enterprise Survey. We use the non-parametric 
measure of productivity – labor productivity, which provides a simple and meaningful means of 
firm productive performance. Different from the related study of Goedhuys, Janz and Mohnen 
(2006), we deal with several econometric issues such as the endogeneity problem, 
heteroscedasticty and multicollinearity of institutional variables. 
Using ordinary least squares and quantile regressions, we find that indirect technology  
factors, rather than R&D activities, have an impact on firm performance. The socio norms and 
networks of informal, rather than formal, institutions remain important as mechanisms in 
financing working capital or the investment purposes of private firms. Second, we empirically 
confirm the paradox of education and training in an emerging economy, providing evidence 
that an inadequately educated workforce can be considered as an economically and statistically 
significant obstacle for firm operation. Third, our results support the argument that beside 
resource- and industry-based views, an institution-based view could be the “third leg” within 
international business research (Peng, Wang, and Jiang, 2008), and that omitting the 
institutional environment in which enterprises operate could limit our understanding of factors 
affecting firm performance.  
In chapter 4, we then extend the existing analysis to the constraints of the investment 
climate (the quality of institutions) on firm technical efficiency (one type of firm productive 
performance). Using the unique and latest panel dataset from the investment climate surveys of 
the World Bank in Vietnam in 2005 and 2009, this chapter calculates another measure of firm 
4 
productive performance – technical efficiency from a parametric production frontier. Firm level 
technical efficiency can be defined as the firm productivity gap to the best firms located on the 
production frontier. Unlike the related study of Kinda, Plane, and Véganzonès-Varoudakis 
(2011), we attempt to deal with the endogeneity bias of investment climate variables by using 
the region-industry average of the investment climate variables, rather than the crude ones. 
Moreover, we do not use principle component analysis that generates a few composite 
indicators of investment climate to tackle the problem of multicollinearity. The approach 
applied for the selection of the investment climate variables goes from the general to the 
specific (e.g., Escribano and Guasch, 2005). Starting from a general model with all variables 
included at once, we then reduce this model to a simple one including relevant (significant) 
variables. In detail, the less significant variables are eliminated one by one, but ensuring the 
existence of at least one investment climate variable from each broad category (Infrastructure, 
Business-Government Relations, Crime and Legal Environment, Finance and Labor) for 
interpretive purposes. 
We estimate the stochastic production frontiers by industry, to discover which sectors have 
a technical inefficiency component. Subsequently, we consider the impacts of investment 
climate on these inefficiency sectors, using time-varying inefficiency models. Similar to Kinda, 
Plane, and Véganzonès-Varoudakis (2011), the results provide empirical evidence that the 
investment climate is significant for firm productive performance. We further indicate that the 
effect of the investment climate on firm efficiency varies according to firm size, export status 
and ownership. Additionally, panel data models and the quality of data allow us to investigate 
the improvement of technical efficiency by industry and the whole Vietnamese manufacturing 
during the period of deeper integration into the world economy. Methodologically, we show 
that time-varying inefficiency model for panel data is better than pooling data one-step 
stochastic frontier analysis in considering the whole manufacturing or industry specific 
technical efficiency impact of the investment climate, for a particular country. It is also possible 
to link our empirical work to recent literature placing the investment climate at the center of 
economic performance (see Kinda, Plane, and Véganzonès-Varoudakis, 2011) by providing 
more specific evidence. Finally, the thesis concludes and offers an outlook for future research 
developments. 
5 
 
2 Trade Liberalization and Labor Market Adjustments  
 
ABSTRACT.
2
 Using both industry and firm level data sets during the period 2003-2008, this 
paper provides the first comprehensive investigation of the impact of trade liberalization on 
employment and wages in Vietnamese manufacturing. Overall, we find empirical evidence that 
trade liberalization has a negative effect on employment and wages. However, the impact 
magnitude is modest with a decline within 2.4%-3.5% in real wages and 0.76% and 0.17% 
reductions in industry and firm employment respectively on average over the period. We 
further investigate the effects of trade liberalization on gender and skill earning gaps and the 
role of trade unions by location. The analysis shows that trade liberalization appears to reduce 
the gender and skill earnings differentials. 
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This part is a joint work with Pham Thi Bich Ngoc and Holger Görg. 
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2.1 Introduction  
Trade openness has historically gone hand in hand with better economic performance, in 
both developed and developing economies, creating new opportunities for workers, consumers 
and firms around the globe through a positive business climate, flexible labor markets, high-
quality education and skill training systems (OECD, 2012). Still, once a developing country has 
opened up to international markets, concerns over employment and wage decline have been 
posed.  
Trade particularly affects employment and wages in several ways. First, trade can increase 
per capita incomes though output growth, resulting in real average wage increases.
3
  Second, 
increased exports and imports can raise productivity growth, creating higher skill and higher 
wage jobs.
4
 However, trade liberalization may, at least in the short term, put pressure on less 
competitive industries, triggering unemployment and downward wage trends. Third, skill-
biased technological change may increase demand for skilled labor, leading to wage inequality 
(Feenstra and Hanson, 1997). Fourth, the impact of trade liberalization possibly increases 
industry wage premium, which reflects industry rents. Furthermore, due to imperfect 
competition, different levels of rent sharing between firms and workers among industries can 
cause wage differentials (Ghazali, 2011). 
Previous empirical studies have found conflicting results about labor market adjustment to 
trade liberalization which could manifest itself through increasing imports, exports, and 
offshoring, or decreasing tariffs and non-tariffs barriers, leading to changes in the effective rate 
of protection (ERP). For instance, Stone and Cepeda (2011) find that imports have a strong and 
positive effect on wages in 55 OECD and non-OECD countries, but Ravenga (1997) produces 
evidence of negative effects of trade reforms on employment and wages in Mexican 
manufacturing. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) find a positive relationship between tariffs and 
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The OECD Growth Study estimated that a 10 percentage point increase in trade openness translates over time into 
an increase of around 4% in per capita income in the OECD area. China and India demonstrate how policies 
thatliberalize trade and investment can contribute to raising incomes in developing countries (OECD, 2012). 
4
Exporters in the United States on average pay wages that are about 6% higher than non-exporters (Bernard et al., 
2007) 
7 
the industry wage premium. Focusing on the impact on employment, Sakurai (2004) concludes 
that increased trade negatively impacts employment for the case of Japan. By contrast, Sen 
(2002) points out that international trade caused positive employment growth in Bangladesh 
and Kenya.  Currie and Harrison (1997) find no impact of trade openness on employment in 
Morocco.  
The specific objective of this study is to investigate how labor markets respond to trade 
liberalization in Vietnam over the period 2003-2008.  We follow and build upon the approach 
by Revenga (1997) and analyze the link between trade liberalization, employment and wages 
using empirical models at both the industry and firm level.  As in Revenga (1997) we allow 
trade protection (measured as effective rate of protection and import penetration) to affect 
wages and employment directly at industry level and indirectly at firm level through changes in 
output and quasi rents. More specifically, in the firm level analysis, we use trade policy 
variables, i.e. effective rate of protection (ERP) and import penetration, as instruments for the 
endogenous independent variables, i.e. output and quasi rents. We use panel datasets at industry 
and firm levels for manufacturing sectors which come from the Vietnamese General Statistics 
Office (GSO) and the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA)’s small and 
medium enterprise (SME) surveys. 
Since opening up to the world economy in 1986, Vietnam has strongly embarked on the 
trade liberalization process by being involved in many bilateral and multilateral agreements 
(Japan, China, US, ASEAN, APEC, EU, WTO), reflecting decreasing ERP and increasing 
import penetration due to tariff reductions. Based on this background, we show a negative 
impact of trade reforms on wages and employment at both industry and firm levels in 
Vietnamese manufacturing over the period 2003-2008. Additionally, the paper improves our 
understanding of trade liberalization effects by taking into account the rent sharing
5
 between 
firms and employees as an adjustment mechanism to face trade policy changes. We find trade-
induced decreases in quasi rents which represent a decline in wages.  
The approach on quasi rents further allows us to identify heterogeneity in bargaining power 
across firms by gender and skill composition. A firm with a greater fraction of unskilled 
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Martins (2007) define rent sharing as “referring to a situation in which rents are shared by the firm, at least in 
some part, with the employees of that firm”. 
8 
(production) or female workers shows a lower ability of workers to capture part of the quasi 
rents. This finding provides evidence for gender and skill earning differentials in Vietnamese 
manufacturing. However, trade liberalization can moderate these gaps as in line with Ghazali 
(2011) for the case of Tunisia.
6
 In addition, trade unions and collective agreements seem to 
have a role in reducing the skill earning inequality. To the best of our knowledge, these 
relationships have not been comprehensively investigated for the case of Vietnam.  
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 and 3 respectively provide the 
literature and some facts on trade liberalization and labor markets. Section 4 presents the data 
and some preliminary evidence.  Section 5 discusses the industry level analysis, while Section 6 
presents the firm level results.  The final section produces some conclusions.  
2.2 Literature on Trade Liberalization and Labor Market 
The Heckscher-Ohlin model and its companion Stolper-Samuelson theorem (HO/SS) set up 
a theoretical background on the labor market effects of trade liberalization whereby trade 
openness increases the relative returns to abundant factor and lowers that of the scarce factor, 
expecting increases in wages and reduction in wage inequality. Some recent studies provide 
support for a HO/SS view of trade (see Friedman et al., 2012; Stone and Cepeda, 2011; Bernard 
et al., 2007) in contrast to the others which find rising wage gaps in both developed and 
developing countries (see Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997; Berman, Bound, and Machin, 1998; 
Pavcnik, 2003). Growing wage inequality can be explained in part by the change in the 
structure of labor demand in favor of skilled workers, resulting from skill-biased technological 
change induced or accelerated by trade liberalization (Acemoglu, 2003). Particularly, the 
underlying causes of changes in labor demand in developing countries are based on the increase 
of capital flows and capital assets from developed to developing countries in the era of 
globalization (Feenstra and Hanson, 1997). 
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Ghazali (2011) indicates that trade reforms appear to have reduced wage inequality between skilled and unskilled 
labor in Tunisia. 
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Referring to employment adjustments, existing literature have found mixed results.
7
 
Difference in employment response to trade liberalization possibly depends on firm behavior in 
lower/higher profit periods or whether labor markets are in short run or long run. Firms can 
reduce their profit margins rather than adjusted employment or instead, they raise productivity 
of the existing workforce and efficiency gains can be achieved without firing labor (see Currie 
and Harrison, 1997; Tybout and Westbrook, 1995). Unemployment could increase in the short 
run due to external or domestic shocks but decline in the long run with permanent changes in 
trade liberalization when labor market returns to long-run employment equilibrium (Dutt, Mitra 
and Ranjan, 2009; Stone and Cepeda, 2011). 
From another perspective, trade liberalization can impact wages and employment directly at 
industry level and indirectly at firm level. A reduction in trade protection that shifts industry 
product demand will tend to move employment in the same direction (Revenga, 1997). Industry 
wage response in turn depends on wage-setting mechanism. With a competitive setting, wages 
react to market-clearing rates of labor supply and demand. In contrast, under imperfect 
competition, because of the presence of unions for instance, wage and employment adjustments 
could be based on industry wage premium.
8
 Industry wage premium channel should be 
considered in short to medium term horizons where prevent free movements of workers across 
sectors. The premiums can take the form of industry rents in the trade models that introduce 
imperfect competition and rent sharing.  
Although trade reforms are usually implemented at the industry level, firm-level wage and 
employment adjustments are expected to vary depending on firm characteristics, for example 
market power level, capital or labor intensity, or workforce composition. Also, the responses 
are based on a wage-setting mechanism which presents the bargaining power of workers with 
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For example, McMillan and Verduzco (2011) show that employment in manufacturing fell in Latin America, the 
Middle East and North Africa and in Sub-Saharan Africa but increased in East Asia and Eastern Europe. Exports 
can contribute to job creation (Heo and Park, 2008; Milner and Wright, 1998; Fu and Balasubramanyam, 2004). 
Gaston (1998) also shows that exports positively affect employment, but imports cause a negative impact in 
Australia. 
8
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) define it as the portion of individual wages that cannot explained by worker, firm, 
or job characteristics, but can be explained by the worker’s industry affiliation. 
10 
the presence of unions or collective agreements. Revenga (1997) produces the results that many 
of the rents generated by trade protection were absorbed by workers in the form of a wage 
premium in Mexican manufacturing. Trade liberalization reduced the rents available to be 
captured by firms and workers. Ghazali (2011), following the approach of Revenga (1997) for 
the case of Tunisia, documents that the quasi rents reduction, which is one of the adjustment 
mechanisms used by Tunisian firms to face trade openness, reduces wage inequality as skilled 
labor was more able than unskilled labor to capture rents before trade reforms. 
In regards to the role of union in dealing with the rent sharing, higher rates of unionization 
as well as higher coverage and coordination of collective bargaining have been found to be 
associated with higher wages, lower levels of income inequality and wage disparity, a lower 
gap between the wages of skilled and unskilled workers as well as a lower gap between men 
and women (Friedman et al. 2012; Aidt and Tzannatos, 2002; Hayter and Weinberg, 2011). On 
the contrary, Reinecke and Valenzuela (2011) argue that the potential role of unions and 
collective bargaining in improving the distribution of wages has been used in a very limited 
manner in Chile. 
Meanwhile, rent sharing can reduce employment fluctuations to trade openness due to the 
presence of unions. Revenga (1997) shows that organized labor is important in Mexico. The 
restrictive labor market regulations in this country make it difficult and expensive to fire a 
worker. The author confirms that if wages contain a rent component, workers can be willing to 
trade off wages to preserve jobs. In contrast, Krugman (1996) argues that in countries with 
rigid wage setting institutions, trade may perhaps have larger effects on employment than 
wages.  Görg and Görlich (2011) point out adjustments through employment levels in Germany 
as wage setting arrangements in this country was a high degree of inflexibility, which is done 
by large unions at the sectoral level.  
2.3 Labor Market in Vietnam under Trade Liberalization 
2.3.1 Trade liberalization and some Facts 
The economic restructuring process (called Doi Moi) started in 1986 when Vietnam 
transformed from a centrally-planned economy to a market-oriented economy. GDP growth 
accelerated to 9.8% annually from the early 1990s to 1998 then fell to 7.3% from 2000 to 2009 
(GSO). The economic structure has changed with the tendency towards industrialization. 
11 
During the period 1990 to 2010, the contribution of the agriculture sector dropped from 38.7% 
to 20.9% while that of industry and construction, and service sectors changed from 22.7% and 
38.6% to 40.2% and 38.9% respectively.  
Figure 2.1: Vietnam’s Imports and Exports, 1990-2010 
 
  Source: GSO (2006, 2011) 
Vietnam’s total export volume grew from around US$ half a million to reach US$ 71.6 
billion in 2010, which is equivalent to an annual growth rate of 20% (GSO, 2006, 2011). 
Imports are generally higher than exports but trade deficits are not very large. Trade 
liberalization contributed to a growing intensity in terms of exports and imports relative to GDP 
(Figure 2.1). 
Since opening up the economy, Vietnam has been party to multilateral and bilateral trade 
agreements and MFN agreements with over 80 nations (MUTRAP, 2011). For example, 
bilateral trade agreements with the European Union and the United States were signed in 1992 
and 2000 respectively. Joining ASEAN in 1995, Vietnam started implementing tariff 
reductions under the Common Effective Preferential Tariff of the ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(CEPT/AFTA) which began in 2001 and was completed by the beginning of 2006. Agreements 
under ASEAN auspices with China and Japan came into effect in 2002 and 2003 respectively. 
The country joined APEC in 1998 and signed an MFN agreement with Japan a year later. In 
addition, as a member of the WTO since 2007, it is bound to many MFN agreements. Each 
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time such a major agreement was reached, Vietnam’s trade with that region expanded, and 
these trade agreements were clearly an impetus to ongoing domestic economic reforms 
(Abbott, Bentzen and Tarp, 2009). In the period 1997-2003, average tariffs on merchandise 
were reduced slowly from 21% to 20.3% while ERP decreased quickly from 121% to 46% 
(Athukorala, 2004).  
Figure 2.2: Tendency of ERP and Import Penetration at Industry Level, 2003-2008 
 
Figure 2.2 shows the trends in ERP and import penetration in the following years from 
2003 to 2008, using the industry level data used in this study.  As we can see, ERP continued a 
downward trend with values lower than 50%. Labor intensive sectors such as Wearing Apparel, 
Tanning and Dressing of Leather are more highly protected than others. ERP are positive for 
most industries; reflecting that returns to capital and labor are higher in these industries than 
they would have been in the absence of tariff protection. However, negative ERP shows that 
firms in these industries can be harmed by intervention, i.e. Manufacture of Refined Petroleum 
Products, or they would be worse off under free trade because of being highly supported by 
state intervention (Appendix 2.1). 
The import penetration rate has an upward tendency from 2003 to 2008 (if we ignore the 
Coke and Refined Petroleum Products industry
9
), reflecting the gradual lifting of trade 
protection. However, import penetration rates still keep decreasing in many sectors including 
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Tanning and Dressing of Leather, Wearing apparel, Medical Precision and Optical Instruments 
(Appendix 2.2). 
Under CEPT/AFTA, Vietnam is committed to reducing tariffs on all but few sensitive items 
from AFTA member countries to less than 5% by the year 2006.  Within the WTO accession 
framework, the 2006 average tariff levels will be reduced from 17.4% to 13.4% after the 
implementation period, generally from 5 to 7 years. The average reduction of tariffs for 
industrial products is from 16.3% to 12.2% over 12 years. Vietnam’s participation in the 
Information and Technology Agreement was the most significant, by which about 330 tariff 
lines for information technology products will be reduced to 0% over a period of 3-5 years. Its 
participation in the Textile and Clothing Agreement leads to a significant tariff reduction for 
these items, in particular textiles from 40% to 12%, and clothing from 50% to 20% (MUTRAP 
II, 2008). 
2.3.2 Labor Market in Vietnam: An Overview 
Vietnam’s population is estimated at approximately 89 million in 2010, of which over 
61.6% is under 25 years of age. Approximately 15.5% of the population are considered to be 
trained or skilled workers (with elementary qualifications or higher) (MUTRAP, 2011).  The 
labor force increased by 2.4 million to a total of 49.3 million persons from 2007 to 2009, 
together with an increase in the labor force participation rate of 2.1% to 76.5% in 2009. Labor 
has a tendency to move from the countryside to large cities like Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh city, 
leading to continuous increases in the proportion of the urban population of working age. For 
example, 1.8 million people moved during 2007-2009 (MOLISA
10
, 2010). The restructuring of 
state owned enterprises and opening up to foreign direct investment has led to a redistribution 
of the labor force, with workers moving from the state sector to private enterprises.  
After WTO accession, employment continues to undergo structural changes with a 
decreasing share in the agriculture sector but increasing shares in the industry and service 
sectors. During the period 1999-2009, the percentage of workers in agriculture, forestry and 
fishing sectors reduced from 64.1% to 51.9%, while that in industry and construction and 
service sectors increased from 12.4% and 23.4% to 21.4% and 26.7% respectively. The 
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Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs 
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unemployment and underemployment rates in urban areas are 4.6% and 3.3% in 2009 (GSO, 
2000, 2010
11
). 
Only 23.1% of the labor force are contracted employees, while the majority of workers are 
self-employed (38.47%) or work in a family business (38.43%). However, demand for skilled 
labor in Vietnam has increased. The rapid development of the private sector in Vietnam is the 
key cause behind the growing demand for labor (VCCI, 2008). In the period 2006-2008, 54% 
of employees were based in the private sector, 22.2% in the foreign invested sector, and 23.8% 
in the state sector. Taking into consideration the gender composition, female workers accounted 
for circa 44% of the total workforce. A larger proportion of female workers are present in 
industries such as manufactures of Wearing apparel, Dressing, or Leather Tanning and 
Dressing (82%-83%) while male workers tend to work in manufactures of Coke, Petroleum, 
Metal products or Transport Equipment (80%). Interestingly, more female than male workers 
appear in high-tech manufactures which produce office machinery, communication equipment, 
or medical instruments (70-75%) (GSO, 2010). 
Wages of employees are subject to minimum rates determined by MOLISA at district levels 
and by enterprise ownership (e.g. VND 1.2 million per month, app. US$ 70-75, in Hanoi 2008, 
for employees in foreign enterprises; and VND 0.8 million for those in domestic enterprise).
12
 
Average salary levels were highest in state enterprises, followed by FDI firms and non-state 
enterprises. For instance, the values are VND 4.067; 3.005; and 2.273 million per month in 
2008 respectively. A worker in the manufacturing sector can, on average, earn VND 2.342 
million per month in 2008 (GSO, 2010). 
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Statistical Year Book 2000, 2010 (GSO) 
12
The minimum wage in 2012 in Hanoi is VND 1.550 million for foreign enterprises, or VND 1.350 million for 
domestic enterprises. 
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Overview on SMEs 
Table 2.1: Number and Share of SMEs by Size of Capital and Employees 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total No. of  
enterprises 
42,297 51,680 62,908 72,012 91,756 112,950 131,318 155,771 205,689 
No. of SMEs and 
growth rates 
(No. of employees 
<300) 
39,897 
 
- 
49,062 
 
23.0% 
59,831 
 
21.9% 
69,697 
 
16.5% 
88,222 
 
26.6% 
109,338 
 
23.9% 
127,593 
 
16.7% 
1517,80 
 
19.0% 
201,580 
 
32.8% 
Shares of SMEs in 
total 
94.3% 94.9% 95.1% 96.8% 96.1% 96.8% 97.2% 97.4% 98.0% 
No. of SMEs and 
growth rates 
(Registered capital 
<10 VND billion) 
36,306 
 
- 
44,670 
 
23.0% 
54,217 
 
21.4% 
61,977 
 
14.3% 
79,420 
 
28.1% 
98,232 
 
23.7% 
114,341 
 
16.4% 
131,888 
 
15.3% 
171,231 
 
29.8% 
Shares of SMEs in 
total 
85.8% 86.4% 86.2% 86.1% 86.6% 87.0% 87.1% 84.7% 83.2% 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on many versions of Statistical Year Books (GSO, 2001-2009) 
An enterprise is small or medium when its number of employees is lower than 300 or its 
registered capital is less than VND 10 billion (nearly US$ 500,000). According to the GSO 
from 2001 to 2009, SMEs in the whole economy, on average, accounted for 96% of total 
enterprises in terms of employee size or 86% in terms of registered capital. The growth rate of 
SMEs in terms of number of employees or registered capital is around 22% annually (Table 
2.1). Also, SMEs in the manufacturing sector accounted circa 87% of total manufacturing 
enterprises in terms of employee size in the period 2005-2009.  
2.4 Data Descriptions 
The industry level data used in this study come from the GSO, which is an institution 
directly under Ministry of Investment and Planning, conducting statistical operations and 
providing socio-economic statistical information at both micro- and macro- levels in Vietnam. 
The firm level data is obtained from the DANIDA’s SME surveys collected in 2005, 2007 and 
2009.  The sample sizes are 2,603 in 2005 (representing 13.2% of total manufacturing 
16 
enterprises), 2,492 in 2007 (8.8%) and 2,492 in 2009 (5.1%). The SME surveys are funded by 
DANIDA and conducted by the Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen in 
collaboration with the Vietnamese Institute of Labor Science and Social Affairs (ILSSA) and 
Central Institute for Economic Management (CIEM). Although they are implemented in 10 
selected provinces (Ha Noi, Phu Tho, Ha Tay, Hai Phong, Nghe An, Quang Nam, Khanh Hoa, 
Lam Dong, Ho Chi Minh City, and Long An), a stratified random sample was chosen such that 
the data set is representative at the provincial level. A rich and intensive range of questionnaires 
cover many modules such as general characteristics, enterprise history, production 
characteristics, employment, investments, etc.
13
 Each survey in a year collects information for 
two previous years (e.g. the survey in 2005 aims to obtain data in the years 2004 and 2003). 
Especially, the surveys are suitable for studies in labor markets. For example, the 
employment module produces information on employment by gender, full-time/ part-time 
status, occupation, workers’ training, labor union, workers’ benefit, recruiting and firing 
process, and wage setting process. Unfortunately, the survey does not specifically ask about 
educational or skill levels of the employees, only their occupation, i.e., managers, 
professionals, sales, service or production workers.  Professionals are defined as those having 
university/college degree (Phan, 2009). Since the information on educational or skill levels of 
the employees are not given, we proxy for the skill composition of employment by using the 
share of production workers in total firm employment, as in Revenga (1997).
14
 
Panel data sets are used for the empirical analysis, comprising 93 industry observations and 
8,849 firm observations from 19 manufacturing sectors in the period 2003-2008. The firm-level 
data set retrieved from DANIDA is merged with the industry-level data, i.e. ERP and import 
penetration. ERP are collected from MUTRAP II (2008), MUTRAP III (2010) for the years 
                                                          
13
For instance, some studies, using the same source of data, investigate the role of unions (Torm, 2012), or the 
informal sector wage gap among Vietnamese micro-firms in Vietnam (Rand and Torm, 2012). Torm, Larsen, and 
Rand (2011) examine the impact of recruitment ties on wages in Vietnam. 
14
Skilled labor activities include engineering, management, administration, and general office tasks while the 
activities of unskilled workers include machine operation, production supervision, repair, maintenance and 
cleaning (Hanson and Harrison, 1995). 
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2005-2008 and Chu and Kalirajan (2011) for the year 2003.
15
 ERP in 2004 are assumed equal 
to the indicator in 2003 due to lack of data. Import penetration ratios are calculated based on 
data collected from the GSO’s reports on International Merchandise trade of Vietnam in several 
years.
16
 
Table 2.2 presents means and standard deviations of key variables, separated into two 
periods 2003-05 and 2006-08 at industry and firm levels. The calculation strategy and 
explanations for these variables are given in Appendix 2.3. Vietnam is involved more in trade 
liberalization in the latter period when completing the AFTA agreement in 2006 and joining the 
WTO in 2007. Thus ERP reduced to 17.7% in this period as tariff barriers were gradually 
lifted. The average import penetration ratio increased over this period, as would be expected.  
Since liberalizing the economy, average industry employment increased, accompanied by a 
higher proportion of female workers. Average SME firm size was smaller in terms of 
employment, together with a reduction in the presence of male and production workers.
17
 An 
SME’s real output increased by 9.6% over the two periods. Wages, cost of capital and log 
capital stock/value added also increased. Real quasi rents per worker increased from 13.4 
million VND to 20.5 million VND.  Furthermore, the decreased share of production workers, 
representing a higher proportion of skilled workers in a firm, may strengthen the bargaining 
power. 
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ERP of an industry is measured by industry value added at domestic price, divided by that at world price, then 
minus 100%. This approach is applied by Trinh and Kobayashi (2012) for the Vietnamese manufacturing 
industries. 
16
Theoretically, import penetration ratios should be measured as the share of imports in domestic demand 
(imports/[production + import – exports]); however, there are problems with measuring domestic demand in some 
industries, which give rise to inconsistencies such as negative domestic demand (Jenkins, 2004). 
17
Shares of female and production workers are only available for the years 2004, 2006, and 2008. We assumed 
these indicators in the previous years are the same as at the current years. 
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics, 2003-2008 
Variables 
(Mean and Standard Deviations) 
Industry-level data Firm-level data 
2003-5 2006-8 2003-5 2006-8 
Total employment 123,911 
[148,278] 
161,136 
[188,384] 
18.99 
[128.59] 
15.46 
[34.74] 
  -  Share of female workers (%) 44.9 
[18.9] 
48.6 
[19.6] 
33.8 
[27.1] 
35.1 
[26.5] 
   - Share of production workers (%)   78.5 
[18.7] 
65.7 
[19.8] 
Real output (bill.VND) 25,500 
[28,500] 
41,300 
[45,300] 
2.5 
[17.5] 
2.74 
[12.3] 
Rel Real annual earnings per worker (mill. 
VND) 
17.9 
[8.7] 
20.6 
[7.8] 
7.51 
[10.5] 
10.8 
[11.5] 
ERP (%) 28.97 
[36.90] 
17.70 
[19.55] 
  
Import penetration ratio (%) 
(Except Manufacture of Coke and 
Refined Petroleum) 
70.3 
[84.3] 
94.0 
[132.5] 
  
Cost of capital (mill. VND)   29.5 
[377] 
62.2 
[526] 
Price raw materials (mill. VND)   1,810 
[14,700] 
1,910 
[9,210] 
Real quasi rents per worker (mill. VND)   13.4 
[103] 
20.5 
[82.8] 
Log Capital stock/Value Added   1.134 
[1.326] 
1.160 
[1.230] 
* Standard Deviations are in parentheses. 
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2.5 Employment and Wage Effects of Trade Liberalization at the 
Industry-Level 
We start off by investigating the impact of trade liberalization on employment and wages 
using industry level data.  To do so, we follow Milner and Wright (1998) and Revenga (1997) 
and estimate simple reduced form employment and wage equations in the following form, 
                                                                                                       
and 
                                                                                                    
where    ,    ,     is respectively total employment, the average real wage measured in terms 
of annual earnings, and total output, in industry j at time t.
18      is a vector of trade 
liberalization variables, including ERP and import penetration. The equations also include time 
(t) and industry (j) specific effects.  All nominal variables are deflated by producer price index. 
The results in Table 2.3 present the industry-level employment and wage responses to trade 
liberalization. For the purpose of estimations, equations (1) and (2) are differenced in order to 
transform out the specific effects, then the OLS and within estimates are applied. Unlike time 
specific effects, industry specific effects are eliminated by the difference transformation of 
variables. 
  
                                                          
18
This labor demand equation can be derived based on a Cobb-Douglas production function, assuming that the cost 
of capital is captured by time dummies (Milner and Wright, 1998).   
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Table 2.3: Industry Employment and Wage Equations with OLS and Within Estimates 
 Employment Wages 
 
OLS 
(1) 
Within 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
Within 
(4) 
Employment   -0.523*** (0.112) -0.657*** (0.057) 
Average real wage -0.639*** (0.123) -0.829* (0.445)   
Output 0.101 (0.168) -0.050 (0.195) 0.026 (0.174) -0.097 (0.278) 
ERP 0.061 (0.213) 0.045 (0.162) 0.110* (0.063) 0.166 (0.114) 
Import penetration -0.016** (0.006) -0.020*** (0.004) -0.006* (0.003) -0.013* (0.006) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.52 0.69 0.38 0.58 
Observations 60 60 60 60 
Notes:   (1) ***, **, and * denote significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
(2) Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
(3) All regressions include a constant term. 
Columns 1 and 2 provide the results for the estimated employment equation. Increases in 
average wage rates cause a fall in employment, whereas changes in industry output and ERP 
appear to have no impact on demand for labor. Furthermore, the results indicate the negative 
and significant impact of rising imports on employment. An increase in import penetration 
from 57% to 95% is associated with a mere 0.76% (=0.38*0.02) decline in labor demand. 
Alternatively, we only find evidence for a modest impact of the increasing import penetration 
on industry-level employment. This finding could potentially reflect the existence of rent 
sharing agreements between firms and workers in Vietnam. As explained by Revenga (1997) 
“to the extent that the dissipation of rents is fully absorbed through lower industry wages there 
need not be any effect on employment”. 
Columns 3 and 4 present the similar findings for the estimated wage equation in the same 
period. The results for the wage effect of trade liberalization are more statistically significant 
21 
compared to those obtained for employment. The coefficient on import penetration is negative 
and statistically significant, indicating that an increase in imports reduced real wage. However, 
the implied wage responses are minor:  an increase in import penetration from 57% to 95% is 
associated only with a 0.49% (=0.38*0.013) decline in real wages. Furthermore, the coefficient 
on ERP is significant in OLS or closes to being significant in within estimates implies that 
reduction in ERP is associated with decreasing industry wages. A decline in ERP from 39% to 
17% reduced real industry wages by 2.4%-3.5%. 
In sum, the existence of a minor negative employment effect of trade liberalization seems to 
support the rent sharing model. Furthermore, as proposed by Feliciano (1994) and Currie and 
Harrison (1997), we can also link this phenomena to the existence of restrictions to the firing of 
workers and the imperfections of product market in Vietnam. By contrast, the industry 
regression reveals a bigger negative association between trade reform and wages. 
Unfortunately, the industry-level analysis cannot go further in explaining what causes the trade-
induced decline in wages and employment in Vietnam. Hence, we now turn to a firm-level 
analysis in order to look more closely at possible channels.   
2.6 Employment and Wage Effects of Trade Liberalization at the Firm-
Level 
Our analysis at the firm level follows closely Revenga (1997), Ghazali (2011) and Abowd 
and Lemieux (1993).We adopt a wage-setting model allowing for the presence of rent-sharing 
behavior under union influence, and competitive wage determination. Accordingly, firms and 
the union bargain only over wages, and then employment is set unilaterally by the firm at the 
level that maximize its profit. 
                                             
      
 
    
         
     
      
                                          
where    reflects the bargaining power of worker in firm i,    
  is the union’s preferred wage 
outcome, and    
  is the alternative/outside wage, representing comparative wage (assumed to 
be the wage in the corresponding industry). As the union’s preferred wage outcome is not 
observed,     
     
   could represent product market competition, namely the quasi rents per 
worker. Equation (2.3) can be rearranged as: 
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where     is considered as a quasi-rent-splitting parameter, reflecting how much of the quasi 
rents is captured by the union.
19
 
If there is heterogeneity in workers’ bargaining power, we can rewrite equation (2.4) as 
follows, with   the average bargaining power parameter across firms and           : 
                       
                                                                          
Trade liberalization is likely to imply a reduction in sector rent (Ghazali, 2011). Such 
impact would be captured by changes in quasi rents per worker at the firm level (Revenga, 
1997). At the same time, the error component in equation (2.5) is likely to be correlated with 
the regressor QR(wit). Thus, we need to use instrumental variables estimation. As shocks to 
quasi rents per worker are likely to result from shocks to product demand or shocks to the costs 
of production. Trade policy changes that may reflect exogenous demand shocks would be 
relevant instruments, which can influence the behavior of both firms and unions.
20
 
For the empirical implementation, we apply the following equation for firm wage 
determination:  
                                       
                                           
where    ,  
 ,      are as above. All nominal variables are deflated by the producer price 
index.  
 
,    are firm and time fixed effects. We include the ratio of capital to value added 
       that shows the firm efficiency in using capital stock and, hence, can determine wages 
(Ghazali, 2011). 
Through the rent sharing approach, trade policy changes can affect firm-level wages 
through two different channels: (1) Changes in industry-level trade barriers should have a direct 
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As in Revenga (1997), quasi rents per worker are constructed as QRit = (Yit – Mit – ritKit – wit
A
Nit) / Nit where Yit 
is sales, Mit is the cost of material inputs, ritKit is the cost of capital inputs, Nit is total employment in firm i at time 
t. 
20
Abowd and Lemieux (1993) rely on export and import price indexes as the instruments for quasi rents in the case 
of Canadians firms. Alternatively, Revenga (1997) uses industry-level tariffs and quotas for the case of Mexican 
manufacturing. 
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impact on the outside wage by shifting the total industry labor demand; and (2) Trade 
liberalization is able to reduce the sector rents and, hence, to reduce the rent component of 
wages in the firms where rent-sharing exists. We use two trade policy instruments for quasi 
rents per worker, namely, the ERP (e.g., Ghazali, 2011; Krishna, Poole, and Senses, 2012)
21
 
and import penetration (e.g., Feliciano, 2001; Kien and Heo, 2009).  
In the empirical analysis we also augment equation (2.6) by adding some more independent 
variables and instruments depending on our purposes in investigating skilled-unskilled and 
male-female wage gaps under the impacts of trade liberalization and the role of unions. 
As regards a firm’s employment response to trade liberalization, changes in trade policy can 
influence employment through their effect on wage setting. If workers are willing to trade off 
wages (e.g., by giving away rents), they may be able to preserve jobs. In the case workers 
prefer to maintain the level of wages, a larger employment effect may be observed. 
Furthermore, trade policy changes directly affect employment by shifting firm’s output. As a 
result, output is endogenously determined in the firm-level employment equation. Therefore, 
we also use ERP and import penetration as instrumental variables. 
                           
                                                    
where    ,    ,    
 ,    ,    ,        are respectively the number of workers, annual average 
real wage, annual industry real wage, real output, the cost of capital, and the ratio of capital to 
value added in firm i at time t.     is the disturbance term. 
We begin the empirical analysis with the firm-level employment equation to observe the 
magnitude of the implied employment response to trade policy changes. We then identify the 
effect of trade liberalization on firm wages in several steps. First, we explore the importance of 
rent sharing in firm-level wage determination. Second, we measure the size of firm quasi rents 
that are affected by trade policy variables and their interactions with the gender composition of 
a firm’s labor force. For further analyses and robustness checks, we also consider heterogeneity 
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Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004, 2005) and Ghazali (2011) emphasize that ERP changes during trade reform 
episodes are not sector-uniform. ERP movements in many developing countries result from government decisions 
to fulfill the GATT and WTO directives that bound the behavior of firms or unions in influencing trade policy 
changes. Hence, this would minimize the endogeneity risk.  
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in bargaining power depending on the skill composition of the workforce and the role of trade 
union location. Apart from firm fixed effects and year effects, we also add industry fixed 
effects to control for unobserved time-invariant industry characteristics.
22
 
The two stage least squares (2SLS) estimation of equation (2.7) is reported in Table 2.4. 
The dependent variable is the log of total employment. The independent variables are the firm 
and industry real annual average wage, the price raw materials, and real output. Instruments 
used for the endogenous real output variable are ERP and import penetration.  
We report the F-statistic for the relevance of excluded instruments (associated p-value) 
from the first-stage regression. When the F-statistic is small (or the corresponding p-value is 
large), the instrumental variable estimates and confidence intervals would be unreliable. We 
find that our instruments are appropriate on this criterion. Furthermore, the instruments are 
valid as indicated by the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions, which cannot reject the 
hypothesis of the instrument validity. Additionally, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test rejects the 
null hypothesis that the specified endogenous regressor (real output variable) can be treated as 
exogenous. 
The first stage estimates reveal a negative and significant effect of increased imports on 
firm real output, though the point estimate is small (-0.004). The coefficient on ERP gets the 
expected sign but is statistically insignificant. The second stage estimates indicate statistically 
significant parameters for the firm real output and average wage. By contrast, the coefficients 
on the industry real wage, the cost of capital, and the capital stock to value added are 
insignificant.  
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Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) find that workers in protected sectors earn less than workers with similar 
observable characteristics in unprotected sectors when they do not control for unobserved time-invariant industry 
characteristics. With industry fixed effects, the result reverses: trade protection increases relative wages. 
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Table 2.4: Results of 2SLS Firm Employment Equations 
 2SLS (First stage) 2SLS (Second stage) 
 Dependent variable: real 
output 
Dependent variable: firm 
employment 
Real output  1.193** (0.465) 
Firm real wage 0.525*** (0.020) -0.858*** (0.245) 
Industry real wage 0.051 (0.051) -0.005 (0.054) 
Cost of capital 0.138*** (0.009) -0.084 (0.065) 
Capital stock/Value added -0.149*** (0.017) 0.052 (0.071) 
ERP 0.056 (0.071)  
Import penetration -0.004* (0.002)  
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes 
Instruments   ERP 
  Import penetration 
F-test (p-value) 0.077  
Sargan test (p-value)  0.697 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (p-value)  0.001 
Observations  3907 3907 
Notes:   (1) ***, **, and * denote significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
  (2) Standard errors in parentheses. 
Empirically, the findings give evidence that increases in import penetration that reduce firm 
output have a negative effect on employment. Based on the first stage estimates, an increase in 
import penetration from 57% to 95% reduces firm output by 0.15% (=0.38*0.004). This in turn 
is associated with a decline in employment by only 0.18% (=0.15%*1.193%). In addition, 
reductions in ERP do not have any significant effect on output and therefore have no impact on 
employment. Combining these results with those obtained from the industry-level equation, we 
can argue that there is minor impact of trade liberalization on employment in Vietnamese 
manufacturing, as in line with Currie and Harrison (1997) and Feliciano (2001).  
We now turn to estimating wage effects.  In the industry level analysis we found that there 
is a negative relationship between trade reforms and wages. In the firm-level analysis, it is 
possible to explore the mechanisms for that adjustment. 
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Table 2.5: Within Estimates of Firm Wage Equations 
 Dependent variable: Firm real average wage 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Quasi rents per worker (QR) 0.165*** (0.005) 0.218*** (0.038) 0.226*** (0.016) 
QR*[QR-avg(QR)]  0.007 (0.012)  
QR*female share   -0.055*** (0.015) 
Industry real wage 0.380*** (0.055) 0.227*** (0.083) 0.396*** (0.060) 
Capital stock/Value added -0.052*** (0.006) -0.042*** (.010) -0.057*** (0.007) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.39 0.34 0.42 
Observations  8849 3969 7072 
Notes:   (1) ***, **, and * denote significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
  (2) Standard errors in parentheses. 
  (3) All regressions include a constant term 
Table 2.5 gives results from estimating equation (2.6) using a within estimator. We find 
evidence for a positive and strongly significant relationship between firm real wage and quasi 
rents per worker that is robust to various specifications. Hence, rent sharing appears to be an 
important component of wage determination in Vietnam. Technically, the quasi-rent-splitting 
parameter determines how much of the quasi rents is captured by the union. In the case these 
rents are completely transferred to union members, we can have a simple figure from the 
coefficient on the quasi rents per worker in column 1 that, on average, union members get 
earnings that are about 16% higher than non-union members (the estimate of the quasi-rent-
splitting parameter is 0.16). This finding to some extent is in line with the results by Torm 
(2012).  Using matched employer-employee panel data, she empirically indicates an average 
union wage gap of about 13% in Vietnam’s SMEs over the 2007-2009.  
The coefficients on the industry real wage and the capital stock to value added have 
expected signs and are highly significant across specifications. This indicates that firm wages 
are also affected by industry labor market conditions and the efficiency in using capital input. 
Following Abowd and Lemieux (1993), Revenga (1997), and Ghazali (2011), we also include a 
term QR*[QR-avg(QR)] that measures the deviation of firm-level quasi rents from the sample 
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average. Similar to Revenga (1997), however, we do not find evidence for heterogeneity in 
bargaining power for firms in the same sector, as indicated by the statistically insignificant 
coefficient on this variable. 
In column 3, we incorporate an interaction variable that allows the quasi-rent-splitting 
parameter to vary systematically with the proportion of female workers in the firm workforce. 
The coefficient on this interaction variable is negative and significant, which shows that the 
quasi-rent-splitting parameter is inversely correlated with the proportion of female workers in 
total firm employment. The point estimate is small (-0.055), but gives evidence of male-female 
earnings inequality in Vietnam.
23
 The higher the proportion of female workers, the lower the 
ability of workers to capture part of the quasi rents.  
In case that quasi rents per worker variable is endogenous, the within estimates above might 
be biased and inconsistent. To deal with this problem, an instrumental variables approach will 
be used for the endogenous quasi rents per worker. Instruments for QR are ERP and import 
penetration. 
The 2SLS regressions are presented in Table 2.6. The result in column 2 supports the 
flexible model of wage setting that captures both the existence of rent sharing behavior and 
competitive wage determination. However, the first estimates result in column 1 does not show 
any statistically significant impact of ERP and import penetration on QR. It might be due to the 
fact that these chosen instruments are weak as the F-test point shows (p-value = 0.179). 
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Torm (2012) finds evidence that there is a substantial gender wage gap with male earnings being between 14% - 
18% higher than for women. 
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In order to attain relevant instruments, the existence of gender earnings differentials in the 
trade liberalization episode suggests to further include interaction variables that permit trade 
policy changes to vary with the proportion of the female workers in the firm labor force. 
Therefore, besides trade policy variables, we also add their interactions with the gender 
composition of the firm workforce as instruments for QR. F-test and Sargan test now indicate 
the relevance and validity of the chosen instruments. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test rejects the 
null hypothesis of exogeneity of the endogenous variable. 
Columns 3 and 4 present the 2SLS estimation results with the interaction variables. The 
first estimates show a positive and significant effect of ERP on quasi rents per worker. 
Furthermore, the results point out the gender composition of the workforce appears to be highly 
relevant. The higher the proportion of female workers in the firm, the less trade liberalization 
decreases the quasi rents per worker. Hence, these findings indicate that trade liberalization 
may reduce the gender earnings gap in Vietnam.  
The second stage estimates also show a positive and highly significant coefficient on quasi 
rents per worker. This indicates that decreases in ERP that reduce quasi rents have a negative 
effect on wages. This is not the case for the import ratio, however.  A decrease in ERP from 
39% to 17% reduces quasi rents by a 5.4%. This in turn is associated with a 2.6% decline in 
firm wages. Combining this finding with the industry-level wage estimates, we find wage 
declines in an interval of 2.4%-3.5% in Vietnamese manufacturing over the 2003-2008 period 
that is due to trade liberalization. 
Table 2.6: Results of 2SLS Firm Wage Equations Regarding Gender Composition 
 2SLS (First stage) 2SLS (Second stage) 2SLS (First stage) 2SLS (Second stage) 
 Dependent variable: 
quasi rents per worker 
Dependent variable: 
firm average real wage 
Dependent variable: 
quasi rents per worker 
Dependent variable: firm 
average real wage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Quasi rents per worker  0.549* (0.291)  0.487*** (0.112) 
Industry real wage -0.501*** (0.079) 0.374*** (0.141) -0.529*** (0.079) 0.340*** (0.067) 
Capital stock/Value added -0.309*** (0.019) 0.074 (0.091) -0.304*** (0.019) 0.054 (0.036) 
ERP -0.103 (0.088)  0.246* (0.140)  
ERP*female share   -0.650*** (0.196)  
Import penetration 0.005 (0.004)  -0.003 (.006)  
Import penetration*female share   0.031** (0.015)  
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Instruments  ERP   ERP 
 Import penetration   ERP*female share 
    Import penetration 
    Importpenet*femaleshare 
F-test (p-value) 0.179  0.000  
Sargan test (p-value)  0.853  0.891 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (p-value)  0.052  0.000 
Observations  6564 6564 6549 6549 
Notes:   (1) ***, **, and * denote significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. (2) Standard errors in parentheses. 
Further analyses and robustness checks 
The potential heterogeneity in bargaining power and the existence of union wage gaps 
suggest that workers do vary in their ability to extract rents across firms and regions. 
Determinants of this differential ability might come from the influence of unions in the local 
market and the skill composition of the firm workforce. 
We reestimate equation (2.5) now allowing for interactions of the trade policy variables and 
the skill composition of a firm’s workforce in the first stage estimation. To further check 
robustness, we add two cost variables in real terms (cost of capital and price raw materials) and 
one interaction variable that allows the quasi-rent-splitting parameter to vary systematically 
with the fraction of unskilled workers in the second step. Furthermore, we also add industry 
fixed effects to control for unobserved time-invariant industry characteristics to the 
specification. 
Results are reported in Table 2.7. The estimated coefficient on quasi rents per worker is 
consistent across various specifications and highly significant in both sign and magnitude. The 
quasi-rent-splitting parameter gets the similar value of about 0.34 across specifications, 
implying that 34% of quasi rents is captured by the union when skill composition of the firm 
workforce and industry fixed effects are taken into account.  
For all specifications, the coefficients on the interaction variable QR*unskilled share are 
negative and statistically significant (or close to being significant once industry dummies are 
included) thus, confirming the evidence of skill earnings inequality in Vietnam.
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The significant and negative coefficient of ERP*unskilled share, furthermore, reveals that 
the higher the proportion of unskilled workers in the firm, the less trade liberalization decreases 
the quasi rents per worker. This suggests that the bargaining power of unskilled workers may 
increase following trade liberalization, as in line with a simple HO/SS story. Vietnam 
specializes in unskilled intensive goods, so trade liberalization means they expand in those 
goods, giving more power to the unskilled workers.  
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Torm (2012) indicates that a worker with education beyond secondary school has a wage that is about 12% 
higher than a worker with only basic education. 
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In columns 3 and 4 we do a similar exercise but only include firms located in the North and 
Centre of Vietnam. Given the historical and institutional context combined with the higher 
concentration of collective agreements in Ho Chi Minh City, south vs rest of country split may 
reveal interesting results relating to bargaining power of workers and skill earnings gap across 
regions.
25
 
Column 4 shows that the size of the quasi-rent-splitting parameter is statistically 
unchanged. However, the coefficients on the interaction variable QR*unskilled share, trade 
policy variables and their interactions with the skill composition of the firm workforce are 
significantly larger in absolute value compared to those attained for all observations. They 
suggest that firm wages in the North and Centre are more influenced by the decline in ERP and 
the increase in imports. Also they reveal that earnings differential between skilled and unskilled 
labor is more serious in these regions than elsewhere. In column 5 and 6, industry fixed effects 
are added to the specification to control for unobserved time-invariant industry characteristics. 
The estimated coefficients on quasi rents per workers, the interaction variable, trade policy 
variables and their interactions with the skill composition of the firm workforce are in line with 
priors in terms of sign and statistical significance. 
To sum up, the firm-level study provides evidence on negative effects of trade liberalization 
on employment and wages with similar magnitudes as industry-level analysis. The firm-level 
analysis also indicates that reductions in quasi rents and firm output in the period of trade 
reforms are channels for those adjustment mechanisms. Interestingly, increased imports play a 
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 Before the reunification in 1975, southern trade unions were more independent toward the government than 
northern trade unions which were under the oversight of the Communist Party (Edwards and Phan, 2008). Despite 
the reunification, some of the ideological and institutional differences between the two parts of the country are 
long lasting through today (see Kim, 2008). Zhu et al. (2008) find that firms in Hanoi (the Vietnam’s capital in the 
North) remain more oriented towards traditional personnel practices, including government wage scales and 
unions’ involvement as government agents, whereas firms in Ho Chi Minh City (the biggest city in the South) 
have a higher rate of adoption of modern human resource management. It is estimated that only 20% of unionized 
private sector firms have collective agreements, although in HCMC, the figure is around 65% (Clarke, Lee, and 
Chi, 2007). Torm (2012) also documents that trade unions in southern firms might be more accountable to their 
members than the rest of the country.   
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minor part in reducing employment, while decreased ERP is responsible for a larger decline in 
wages. 
2.7 Conclusion 
The vulnerability of wages and employment to trade liberalization is always concerned in 
developing countries, including Vietnam where has been strongly involved in trade openness in 
the recent years. Vietnam is characterized by the large proportion of SMEs and high rates of 
unskilled workers. Trade liberalization in this economy goes hand in hand with commitments to 
cut down tariffs when joining the AFTA and the WTO. Although trade affects labor market in 
different ways, the economic model in this study analyzes the response to trade liberalization 
through the industry wage premium, which in turn, represents rent sharing. By this approach, 
given trade policy variables such as ERP and import penetration could stimulate a direct effect 
on wages and employment at industry level but an indirect impact at firm level. Therefore, they 
are treated as instruments in order to deal with endogeneity in the firm-level analysis. 
Furthermore, this approach permits us to investigate factors such as worker gender or skill in 
capturing part of quasi rents.  
Our econometric analysis suggests that there is a negative effect of trade liberalization 
through decreased ERP on wages in Vietnamese manufacturing, although the impact is 
moderate. As regarding import penetration, we find a negatively significant but minor impact 
on firm employment. That means imports might not be a cause for rising anxiety over 
increasing unemployment. In addition, we find evidence of gender and skill earning inequalities 
in Vietnamese manufacturing, and these gaps decrease under trade liberalization. Furthermore, 
when taking into account the influence of unions by region, trade unions and collective 
agreements seem to reduce the skill earnings differentials in Vietnamese manufacturing. 
In conclusion, we should not have a negative look on the response of labor market to trade 
openness for the case of Vietnam. Instead of fearing trade liberalization, Vietnam should 
enhance domestic policies to protect unskilled or female workers by upgrading education and 
training level, strengthening the role of trade unions in firms, or launching policies to help 
enterprises improve their productivity in order to ensure greater fairness in  the allocation of 
rents to workers and create more jobs.   
Table 2.7: Results of 2SLS Firm Wage Equations Regarding Skill Composition 
 All observations Observations in the Centre and North All observations 
 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
 QR Firm real wage QR Firm real wage QR Firm real wage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
QR  0.342*** (0.097)  0.344*** (0.117)  0.338*** (0. 092) 
QR*unskilled share  -0.372** (0.146)  -0.404*** (0.155)  -0.263 (0.174) 
Industry real wage -0.593*** (0.112) 0.115 (0.077) -0.692*** (0.152) 0.152 (0.095) -0.888** (0.290) 0.358* (0.199) 
Capital stock/Value added -0.465*** (0.034) -0.133** (0.054) -0.462*** (0.052) -0.144*** (0.053) -0.478*** (0.034) -0.087 (0.074) 
Cost of capital -0.002 (0.019) -0.011 (0.008) -0.035 (0.026) -0.012 (0.013) -0.009 (0.019) -0.013 (0.008) 
Price raw materials 0.186*** (0.030) 0.001 (0.024) 0.149*** (0.045) -0.025 (0.024) 0.178*** (0.031) -0.017 (0.030) 
ERP 2.375*** (0.433)  2.765*** (0.580)  2.464*** (0.465)  
ERP*unskilled share -2.788*** (0.539)  -3.209*** (0.705)  -2.821*** (0.556)  
Import penetration -0.016 (0.022)  -0.018 (0.027)  -0.044 (0.033)  
Import penet*unskilled share 0. 046 (0.030)  0. 060* (0.035)  0. 027 (0.031)  
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes 
F-test (p-value) 0.000  0.000  0.000  
Sargan test (p-value)  0.282  0.409  0.567 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (p-
value) 
 0.020  0.006  0.113 
Observations  3023 3023 1889 1889 3023 3023 
Notes: (1) ***, **, and * denote significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. (2) Standard errors in parentheses.  
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Appendix to Chapter 2 
Appendix 2.1: Effective Rate of Protection in Vietnam by Industry, 2003-2008 
INDUSTRY 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Food Products And Beverages .522 - .313 .299 .288 .273 
Tobacco Products .857 - .457 .457 .46 .463 
Textiles 1.23 - .51 .618 .179 .183 
Wearing Apparel; Dressing And Dyeing 
Of Fur 
1.651 -  .136 .58 .584 
Tanning And Dressing Of Leather ... .698 - .463 .463 .558 .503 
Wood And  Products Of Wood ... .112 - -.023 -.023 -.022 -.026 
Paper And Paper Products .412 - .18 .236 .224 .208 
Publishing, Printing And Reproduction Of 
Recorded Media 
.137 - .1 .12 .06 .1 
Coke, Refined Petroleum Products And 
Nuclear Fuel 
 - .05 -.0097 -.0094 -.0056 
Chemicals And Chemical Products .079 - .022 .111 .11 .102 
Rubber And Plastics Products .345 -  .353 .351 .322 
Other Non - metallic Mineral Products .376 - .25 .294 .284 .26 
Basic Metals -.067 - -.01 -.096 -.074 -.067 
Fabricated Metal Products ... .053 - .03 .0056 .0085 .012 
Machinery And Equipment and etc. -.142 - -.085 -.057 -.051 -.048 
Electrical Machinery And Apparatus and 
etc. 
.12 - .16 .059 .058 .058 
Radio, Television And Communication 
Equipment 
.11 -  .039  .032 .016 
Medical, Precision And Optical 
Instruments ... 
-.009 - 0 -.028 -.028 -.029 
Motor Vehicles, Trailers And Semi - 
trailers 
.571 - .326 .32 .31 .3 
Other transport equipment .274 - -.09 .083 .084 .083 
Furniture; Manufacturing and etc. .457 - .57 .387 .361 .328 
 
Source: MUTRAP II (2008), MUTRAP III (2010) for the years 2005-2008 and Chu and Kalirajan (2011) 
for the year 2003 
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Appendix 2.2: Import Penetration in Vietnam by Industry, 2003-2008 
INDUSTRY 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Food Products And Beverages .135 .135 .129 .129 .154 .175 
Tobacco Products .18 .196 .064 .027 .017 .033 
Textiles 1.506 1.121 1.285 1.041 1.065 1.223 
Wearing Apparel; Dressing And Dyeing 
Of Fur 
.345 .35 .116 .066 .052 .052 
Tanning And Dressing Of Leather ... .468 .386 .357 .307 .068 .071 
Wood And  Products Of Wood ... - - .375 .45 .417 .386 
Paper And Paper Products .389 .393 .564 .572 .346 .561 
Publishing, Printing And Reproduction Of 
Recorded Media 
.058 .081 .091 .093 .112 .063 
Coke, Refined Petroleum Products And 
Nuclear Fuel 
36.107 35.483 38.626 33.057 56.571 30.624 
Chemicals And Chemical Products .607 .518 1.615 1.498 1.685 1.591 
Rubber And Plastics Products .562 .578 .339 .346 .357 .393 
Other Non - metallic Mineral Products .114 .112 .118 .102 .112 .119 
Basic Metals 1.386 1.305 2.074 2.429 2.306 2.578 
Fabricated Metal Products ... - - .228 .234 .291 .275 
Machinery And Equipment and etc. - -  4.329 4.901 5.315 6.204 
Office, Accounting And Computing 
Machinery 
- - .87 .909 .863 .511 
Electrical Machinery And Apparatus and 
etc. 
- - .588 .496 .655 .749 
Radio, Television And Communication 
Equipment 
- - 1.244 1.435 1.315 1.972 
Medical, Precision And Optical 
Instruments ... 
- - 3.248 4.154 3.124 1.746 
Motor Vehicles, Trailers And Semi - 
trailers 
1.064 1.02 .684 .468 .659 .78 
Other transport equipment - - .176 .13 .346 .314 
Furniture; Manufacturing and etc. - - .135 .131 .134 .126 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the GSO’s reports on International Merchandise trade of 
Vietnam in several years 
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Appendix 2.3: Calculation Strategy and Explanations for Key Variables 
 Real output Industry or firm output, deflated by the Producer Price Index (base year 2000; 
unit: bill.VND). 
Employment - Total number of worker in an industry; or, 
- Total number of full-time workers in firms at the year-end. 
Real wage - Average industry wage; or, 
- Total payments for employees divided by total firm employment, then deflated 
by the Producer Price Index (base year 2000; unit: mill. VND). 
Cost of capital Total interest payment of firms in a year, deflated by the Producer Price Index 
(base year 2000; unit: mill. VND). 
Price raw materials Value of raw materials used, deflated by the Producer Price Index (base year 
2000; unit: mill. VND). 
Real quasi rents per 
worker 
QR = (Y – M – r*K – w
A*
N) / N, deflated by the Producer Price Index (base year 
2000; unit: mill. VND), where Y, M, r*K, N respectively denote firm sales, the 
cost of material inputs, the cost of capital inputs, and total firm employment 
(Revenga, 1997). 
Capital stock/Value 
Added 
Total physical assets at the year-end, divided by total value added, then deflated 
by the Producer Price Index (base year 2000). 
ERP Effective rate of protection, as in percentage, collected from MUTRAP II 
(2008), MUTRAP III (2010), and Chu and Kalirajan (2011). 
Import penetration 
ratio 
Percentage of imports in total output. 
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3 Technology, Institutions and Productivity: An Empirical 
Investigation 
 
ABSTRACT.
26
 This chapter investigates the determinants of productivity in Vietnamese 
manufacturing industries. We analyze impacts of technology and institutions on firm 
productivity in considering different types of firms by productivity level. The findings give 
evidence that while indirect technological factors such as foreign ownership, ISO certificate, 
owning a website appear to keep consistent effects for all types of firms, institutional factors 
result in different impacts subject to low- or high-productivity firms. Also informal institutions 
seem to play an essential role in financing firm working capital and investment purposes.  
  
                                                          
26Research from this chapter is accepted for publication as “Long, P.D. (2012) Technology, Institutions and 
Productivity: Evidence from Vietnamese Manufacturing. Journal of International Business Research, Vol.11, 
Special Issue No.2, 109-18. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Vietnam is in the early stage of its industrialization process with a high importance of 
manufacturing activities in the economy. Manufacturing industries contribute the largest share to 
GDP growth, although their contributions stagnated recently (31.9% of overall GDP growth in 
the period 2006 – 2009 compared with 31.7% in 2001 – 2005). Among many reasons highlighted 
in the literature are problems of low capital efficiency, labor productivity and inefficiency as 
well as the obstacles created by institutional environment (Nguyen & Pham, 2010). 
The distortion of the market stimulates firms to speculate land and real estate rather than to 
invest in upgrading technology, developing new products, and improving employee skills. Also 
the lack of adequate intellectual property protection provides little intensive for firm innovation 
(Vietnam Competitiveness Report, 2010). Furthermore, scarcity of high-skill labor, low 
technological capability of domestic firms and weak forward and backward linkages between 
foreign-owned and domestic enterprises have prevented effective technology transfer (Tue Anh, 
2009). Long (2011) finds no strong evidence supports technical efficiency improvement in 
Vietnamese manufacturing firms after this country became an official WTO member. Comparing 
the two newly industrialized nations in the South East Asian region, Prajogo et al. (2007) find 
insignificant differences between Thai and Vietnamese manufacturing firms with respect to 
manufacturing strategies, resources, and innovation performance. The effect of technology on 
product innovation, however, is significantly stronger among Thai firms than Vietnamese firms.  
It is widely recognized that institutions are central to explain why some countries have 
performed better than others.
27
 However, empirical evidence on the firm performance impact of 
institutions within countries is scarce, especially for individual firms. Vietnam is a suitable case 
for this study because the country has gone through a transition process and has a homogeneous 
political system and government structure. A high level of decentralization is the key factor 
leading to dispersed power across different parts of governments and regions (Vietnam 
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See, for example, Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) for a good discussion. 
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Competitiveness Report, 2010). Not surprisingly, economic performance is substantially 
different across regions.
28
  
After a short period of over-excitement of joining the WTO from early 2007, GDP growth of 
the whole economy and GDP growth by manufacturing industries decreased tremendously. 
Recent achievements are lower than state’s potential and capability. The quality of economic 
growth, productivity, efficiency and competitiveness are low and improved slowly (The Ninth 
Central Committee Conference of the Communist party, 2009). It is agreed that the weaknesses 
of the economy and manufacturing in the context of the global economic crisis could be 
overcome to some extent if the technological and institutional factors had not created obstacles to 
economic development (Vietnamese Business Forum Report, 2011).  
This paper aims to provide evidence on the link between technology, institutions and 
productivity using firm level data collected in Vietnam as part of the World Bank Enterprise 
Survey 2009. Our study contributes to the limited literature on the firm performance effects of 
technology and institutions within the context of a single country in several ways. First, we 
provide a different but useful look of Vietnamese private firms. In order to understand what is 
going on in their operation, one should also pay attention to indirect and informal aspects. 
Indirect technology factors instead of R&D activities have impact on firm performance. Informal 
institutions–socio norms, networks rather than formal remain important as mechanisms in 
financing working capital or investment purposes of private firms.
29
 Second, our paper 
empirically confirms the paradox of education and training in an emerging economy. Vietnam 
has a high rate of literacy (around 91% of the population aged 15 or older can read and write), 
                                                          
28Tran, Grafton, and Kompas (2009) state that “The political system and government structures in Vietnam are 
identical everywhere but the implementation of the central government’s law and regulations varies across regions. 
In particular, differences are more pronounced between the north and the south of the country. History, geography 
and the complexity of laws and regulations are key factors explaining institutional variation”. 
29
Steer and Sen (2010) show empirical evidence that informal institutions–ties with friends and family, and social 
and business networks–contribute to the risk management by firms in the private sector even as the economy 
matures and new formal institutions gradually develop. 
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however, graduates are lack of practical knowledge and working skills.
30
 Inadequately educated 
workforce is seen as an economically and statistically significant obstacle for firm operation. 
Third, this paper supports for the argument that beside resource- and industry-based views, 
institution-based view could be the “third leg” in international business research (Peng et al., 
2008). Omitting institutional environment in which enterprises operate could limit our 
understanding of factors affecting firm performance. Fourth, our research attempt to deal with 
the endogeneity bias of institutional variables by using dummy variables instead of variables 
measured by index or variables instrumented by their mean value averaged across industry and 
region.
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We find evidence that some direct technological variables, for example, investing in 
research, patenting and licensing, labor training and educational level of top manager are 
insignificant. However, indirect technological factors such as foreign ownership, ISO certificate, 
owning a website and educational level of employee appear to have an impact on firm 
productivity. For institutional factors, there is no evidence that access to finance affects firm 
performance. Other institutional variables such as practices of competitors in the informal 
sectors, inadequately educated workforce, obstacles in policy and administration have different 
impact depending on firm level productivity.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: the next section outlines literature 
review and issues to be explored. Section 3 describes research methodology. Section 4 is for 
data, variables and summary statistics. Econometric results are discussed in Section 5 and section 
6 concludes. 
3.2 Literature Review and Issues to be explored 
The importance of innovation and institutional factors in explaining productivity has long 
been recognized, although estimates of their empirical significance at the microeconomic level 
                                                          
30
A survey conducted by the Vietnam Student Association showed that 50% of graduates in Vietnam cannot find 
jobs in their field and those who have to be retrained account for a significant share (Vietnam Competitive Report, 
2010).  AmCham (2010) reported that 78% of the population aged 20 – 24 is untrained or lacks the necessary skills. 
31
This approach is, thus, somewhat in line with the approach used by Goedhuys, Janz and Mohnen (2006), Escribà-
Folch (2009) and Steer and Sen (2010) for institutional variables. 
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have started to progress only more recently. There are a number of studies that assess the effect 
of different dimensions of the business environment on firm performance, however, the literature 
relating to firm productivity performance effects of innovation and institutions is somewhat less 
than satisfactory.
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Theoretically, one way of increasing productivity is through innovative activity such as 
inventing new technologies or investing in research, patenting and licensing (Baumol, 2002). 
However, this kind of activity requires large efforts and faces risks of failure. For innovation in 
developing countries (DCs) it may be more suitable to use existing technologies than to create 
new ones. Hence, the importance of building up a technological capability in adopting new 
technologies developed outside has been considered (Lall, 1992). Firms in DCs can access 
existing technologies by licensing contracts, cooperation agreements or receiving foreign 
investments together with training their workforce.  
Besides technological activities, institutions that guide and shape human interactions have 
impacts on firm performance through incentives to invest (see Coase, 1998; Williamson, 1987). 
Efficient institutions can increase returns to economic activity, create new investment 
opportunities and fairer games for all types of formal sectors. On the other hand, bad institutions 
may lead businesses to undertake inefficient and costly alternative investment. Institutions can be 
formal rules including laws and regulations, property right, the court system or informal rules 
such as social norms, habits and practices, social conventions, networks. 
Using firm level data on 70,000 enterprises in 107 countries, Aterido, Hallward-Driemeier 
and Pagés (2007) regress employment growth on the investment climate constraints controlling 
for a variety of firm characteristics. They find that low access to finance and ineffective business 
regulations reduce the growth of all firms, especially micro and small firms. Corruption and poor 
infrastructure create growth bottlenecks for medium and large firms. 
Goedhuys, Janz and Mohnen (2006) use a micro data set from the World Bank Investment 
Climate Survey to investigate how technology and institutions affect productivity in Tanzanian 
manufacturing firms. They evidence that only indirect technological variables (ISO certification, 
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For a review of the effects of technology and institutions on firm productivity, we refer to, e.g., Goedhuys, Janz 
and Mohnen (2006), and Dethier, Hirn, and Straub (2010). 
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foreign ownership and high education of the manager) appear to affect productivity, whereas 
institutional variables such as formal credit constraints, administrative burdens related to 
regulations, business support services and membership of a business association are highly 
significant and robust to different specifications of the model. 
Hallward-Driemeier, Scott and Xu (2006) discuss how ownership and business climate 
impact on firm performance using the China investment climate survey 2000. They regress four 
different firm performance indicators (sales growth, investment rate, productivity and 
employment growth) on business climate indicators (measured as city-industry averages) and 
control variables. The results show that the variable ownership is significant, labor market 
flexibility weakly significant while there is no evidence that physical infrastructure and average 
access to finance affect firm performance. 
3.3 Research Methodology 
In order to examine the impact of technological and institutional factors on firm level 
productivity, we start off with a Cobb – Douglas – type production function similar to Goedhuys, 
Janz and Mohnen (2006). 
                 
   
 
            (3.1) 
Valued added    is a function of traditional variables such as capital    and labor    as well 
as total factor productivity A. It means that    can increase without an increase in the quantity of 
inputs   ,    once there is an increase in efficiency A. Technological variables      and 
institutional variables      are observable factors explaining differences in productivity. It is 
assumed that they do not affect the marginal productivity of capital and labor.  
Productivity can be calculated as the ratio of an output to a specific factor or to all relevant 
factors of production. In this paper, we apply the non-parametric measure of productivity – labor 
productivity, which gives a simple and meaningful way of firm productivity performance. 
Dividing both sides of equation (1) by L and taking logarithms we get: 
       ⁄      (         )           ⁄                         (3.2) 
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In this equation, total factor productivity is assumed to be a linear function of technological 
and institutional variables. The coefficient for      measures the deviation from constant returns 
to scale. 
Furthermore, a firm can increase the labor productivity by operating at higher capacity so 
equation (3.2) can be adjusted like that: 
       ⁄      (         )           ⁄                            (3.3) 
where variable CU is termed capital utilization and expected to be positive. 
This equation is estimated using two different techniques: ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression and quantile regression. While OLS is a useful tool for summarizing the average 
relationship between the outcome and its predictors, based on the conditional mean function, this 
provides only a partial view of the relationship. Heterogeneity in firm characteristics and abilities 
that are not reflected in explaining variables are assumed to be random and to vanish in the 
mean. Possible differences across firms are thus ruled out (Goedhuys, Janz and Mohnen, 2006)). 
Therefore, if we want to have a more complete picture that provides information about the 
relationship between technology, institutions and productivity at different points in the 
conditional distribution of the productivity, Quantile regression is a statistical tool for building 
just that picture (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009). This type of regression has been employed in the 
international economics literature by, for example, Girma and Görg (2002). 
Quantile regression is an extremum estimator but instead of minimizing the sum squared 
residuals like OLS, it minimizes the objective function: 
 (  )   ∑  |      
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where       and    is used to reveal that different choices of q estimate different values of 
b. 
If q = 0.25, much more weight is placed on prediction for observations with      
   (the 
low-productivity firms) than for observations with      
   (the high-productivity firms). The 
lower quartile presents the less productive firms. 
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If q = 0.5, giving the least absolute deviations estimator. In the median regression, the 
coefficients will be estimated by minimizing the absolute deviations from the median. As an 
estimate of central tendency, the median is a resistant measure that is not as greatly affected by 
outliers as is the mean. 
If q = 0.75, much more weight is placed on prediction for observations with      
   (the 
high-productivity firms) than for observations with      
   (the low-productivity firms). The 
upper quartile presents the high productive firms. 
 3.4 Data, Variables and Summary Statistics 
The data are derived from the Enterprise Survey undertaken in Vietnam by the World Bank 
in 2009. The survey covers 1,053 firms in five regions containing 14 provinces – Red River   
Delta (Ha Noi, Ha Tay, Hai Duong, and Hai Phong), the North Central Coast (Thanh Hoa, Nghe 
An), Mekong River Delta (Can Tho, Long An, Tien Giang), South Central Coast (Khanh Hoa, 
Da Nang) and South East (Ho Chi Minh City, Binh Duong, Dong Nai). The data are stratified by 
industry, establishment size and region with 808 enterprises selected from the manufacturing 
sector. Excluding observations with missing information, we have a total of 545 observations 
available for the analysis. No firm is owned 100% by Govermnent/State. 
Table 3.1 indicates that firms in low-technology and labor-intensive industries accounts for 
over 70% of the enterprise sample. Majority of them are medium and large firms, and mainly 
distribute in the South and the North of Vietnam.  
Table 3.1: Composition of Sample in Terms of Industry, Region and Firm Size 
Region 
Industry North Centre South Total 
Food 31 30 54 115 
Textiles 24 02 65 91 
Garments 32 14 54 100 
Non metallic products 44 29 59 132 
Metallic products 40 24 43 107 
Total 171 99 275 545 
Firm size (number of employee) 
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Industry 5 – 19 20 – 99 100+ Total 
Food 30 41 44 115 
Textiles 16 44 31 91 
Garments 9 29 62 100 
Non metallic products 14 53 65 132 
Metallic products 29 42 36 197 
Total  98 209 238 545 
The variables involved in the regression are defined as follows: 
Labor productivity VA/L is measured by the value added per employee. Value added is the 
value of total sales minus costs of raw materials, intermediate goods, fuel and electricity. All 
values are for the year 2008. 
The variable labor L is the number of total employees in the given year. It is the sum of 
permanent workers and adjusted temporary workers.
33
 The number of adjusted temporary 
workers is the total number of paid short-term workers multiplied by the average length of 
employment for each of these workers and then divided by the average length of employment of 
permanent workers. 
The capital input K is the firm’s capital stock – the net value of fixed assets (net value of 
machinery, vehicles, equipments, land and building) by the end of the year 2008. 
Part of total factor productivity is attributed to capital utilization. Firms can produce more 
with the same amount of inputs if they operate at higher capacity. The variable capacity 
utilization is percentage of capacity utilized.
34
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Enterprise Surveys Country Note Series (2011) shows that Vietnamese firms employ more temporary workers, on 
average nearly 36, compared with only 8 in other lower-middle-income economies.  
34This variable is based on the question “In fiscal year, what was this establishment’s output produced as a 
proportion of the maximum output possible if using all facilities available (capacity utilization)?” in the World Bank 
Enterprise Survey – Manufacturing Module (2009). 
 
46 
Besides the traditional variables labor and capital, two additional sets of variables are 
constructed. One presents the technological issues that firms can choose to improve their 
technological capability in producing goods, another relates to the institutional environment in 
which firms operate. 
Firms can build up a stock of technological knowledge through a knowledge accumulation 
process, for example, investing in research and development activities. The dummy variable 
Patent, a proxy variable for R&D, equals 1 for firms that have any patents registered in Vietnam 
or abroad and 0 if not. But more practically, firms can use technology from abroad through 
establishing ownership linkages or through licensing from foreign-owned companies in the case 
of developing countries. Foreign is a dummy variable, equals 1 if firms have foreign ownership 
and 0 otherwise. A firm is defined having foreign ownership when its foreign capital accounts 
for at least 10% of its total capital, following Nguyen and Ohta (2008). The dummy variable 
License is 1 for firms that use technology licensed from a foreign-owned company and 0 
otherwise. 
However, making use of technology or efficiently applying R&D results on production 
depends much on the educational level of the workers and the top manager as well as the firms’ 
training activities. The dummy variable Education of employee is the average educational degree 
of a typical production worker in a firm, equals 1 if high school level or higher and 0 if under 
high school level. Education of Top manager, a dummy variable for top manager’s educational 
level, is 1 if university degree or higher and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable Training equals 1 
for firms offering formal training to their employees and 0 if not. 
Furthermore, by attaining and maintaining the criteria of international quality certifications 
and owning a website, firms have the efficient ways to communicate, introduce themselves and 
get more chances to successfully access clients. These really make sense for firms in DCs to 
improve their performances and internationally integrate. In this analysis, ISO certification is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if firms have an internationally-recognized quality certification 
such as ISO 9000, 9002 or 14000 and 0 otherwise. Another dummy variable Internet is 1 if firms 
own a website and 0 if not.   
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Institutions are increasingly viewed as key determinants of total factor productivity (Coe, 
Helpman, and Hoffmaister (2009) and, hence, of firm performance. The institutional 
environment in Vietnam has a profound influence on firm productivity (Tran, Grafton, and 
Kompas, 2009; Steer and Sen, 2010; Nguyen, Le, and Bryant, 2012). Based on the survey 
questionnaires and the feedbacks of respondents relating to the biggest obstacle faced by their 
firms, we focus on four institutions that have been emphasized in the literature for the regression 
analysis:
35
 
 Informal compete equals 1 for firms report ‘Practices of competitors in the informal 
sector’ is obstacle for their business. 
 Access to Finance is 1 if firms report ‘Access to finance’ which includes availability and 
cost, interest rate, fees and collateral requirements to be obstacle. 
 Labor problem equals 1 if firms recognize that ‘Inadequately educated workforce’ 
severely hamper their current operations. 
 Governance is 1 for firms report ‘Customs and trade regulations’, ‘Business licensing and 
permits’, ‘Tax administration’, ‘Tax rates’ severely hamper their performance. 
Dummy variables are also introduced to control for variations across industries and regions 
as follows:  
Industry dummies: because of the limited sizes of some original industries, we combine 
chemicals, plastics & rubber and non metallic mineral product into one group industry (called 
non metallic products) and basic metals, fabricated metal products and machinery and equipment 
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It is important to emphasize that these institutional variables mainly characterize the quality of institutions or 
institutional performance. They do not reflect forms of institutions or institutional designs. The paper of Coe, 
Helpman, and Hoffmaister (2009) is a good example of using institutional performance rather than institutional 
designs. They use various proxies for institutions such as ease of doing business, quality of tertiary education, patent 
protection, and legal origins. Le and Cheong (2010), however, indicate that the above institutional performance 
measures often change and are therefore relatively more prone to endogeneity problems as compared to institutional 
designs. Unlike Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister (2009), we create dummy variables instead of variables measured 
by index as various proxies for institutions. It seems to be a reliable approach. We do not find significant differences 
in the estimated coefficients with and without institutional variables in the models. The results are reported in 
Appendix 3.1. 
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into another group industry (named metallic products), making a new classification of five 
industries in the manufacturing sector. There are four industry dummies with Food industry as 
the reference group. 
Region dummies: due to the differences in industrial development degree among regions, we 
combine Central North, Southern Central Coastal into one region (called the Centre) and 
Mekong River Delta and South East into another region (called the South). There are two region 
dummies with the North as the reference group. 
Summary statistics of the variables used in the regression analyses are presented in Table 3.2. 
With respect to the sample makeup, the firm innovative activities are so limited. Only 5% of the 
enterprise sample have any patents registered and less than 10% use technology licensed from a 
foreign-owned company. Despite the educational degree of workers, on average, is high school 
level or higher, 41% of the firm surveyed offer formal training to their employees. About 44% of 
these enterprises own a website and 27% have an internationally-recognized quality 
certifications. Related to institutional problems, practices of competitors in the informal sector 
and access to finance are the main concerns of the enterprise sample. They account for over 50% 
of the obstacles firms face in their business. 
Table 3.2: Summary Statistics 
 Obs Mean Standard Dev  Expected sign 
Dependent variable      
Log value added per employee 437 18.14 1.15   
Traditional variables      
Log Labor 544 4.41 1.44  +/- 
Log (Capital/Labor) 431 18.06 1.45  + 
Capital Utilization 534 0.77 0.18  + 
Technological variables      
Patent 538 0.05   + 
Foreign 543 0.13   + 
License 542 0.09   + 
Education of employee 538 0.50   + 
Education of top manager 537 0.67   + 
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Training 541 0.41   + 
ISO certification 544 0.27   + 
Internet 545 0.44   + 
Institutional variables      
Informal compete 541 0.54   - 
Access to Finance 543 0.50   - 
Labor problem 536 0.06   - 
Governance 545 0.15   - 
The coefficients of firm productivity and technological variables presented in Tables 3.3 
confirm the correlations between firm productivity and technological factors. The statistics show 
that firm performance is positively correlated with the foreign ownership, license, education of 
employee, education of manager, labor training, ISO certificate, and owning a website. The 
result from Table 3.4 indicates the negative relationship between firm productivity and obstacles 
from institutional environment, however, none of these correlation coefficients is statistically 
significant.
36
 Thus, it is imperative to control for variations across industries, regions and firm 
level productivity in order to obtain consistent estimates of the impact of technology and 
institutions on firm productivity.  
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We also check the multicollinearity among the predictors. The VIF values for these variables are lower than 2.5 
(mean VIF = 1.43). There is no multicollinearity in our regressors. 
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Table 3.3: Correlation of Firm Productivity and Technological Factors 
 Log 
(VA/L) 
Patent Foreign License Educ of 
Emp. 
Educ of  
Man. 
Training ISO 
Cer. 
Internet 
Log (VA/L) 1.000         
Patent 0.051 1.000        
Foreign 0.228* -0.012 1.000       
License 0.103* 0.047 0.131* 1.000      
Educ of Emp. 0.166* -0.006 -0.024 0.125* 1.000     
Educ of  Man. 0.140* 0.034 0.269* 0.163* 0.195* 1.000    
Training 0.115* 0.123* 0.107* 0.209* 0.116* 0.267* 1.000   
ISO Cer. 0.275* 0.111* 0.153* 0.242* 0.125* 0.342* 0.363* 1.000  
Internet 0.245* 0.120* 0.062 0.169* 0.153* 0.255* 0.329*  0.347* 1.000 
Note: * indicates significance at the 5% level or lower 
 
Table 3.4: Correlation of Firm Productivity and Institutional Factors 
 Log (VA/L) Informal 
compete 
Access to Finance Labor 
problem 
Governance 
Log (VA/L) 1.000     
Informal compete -0.073 1.000    
Access to Finance -0.060 0.124* 1.000   
Labor problem -0.029 0.020 0.075 1.000  
Governance -0.067 0.123* 0.027 -0.032 1.000 
 Note: * indicates significance at the 5% level or lower 
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3.5 Econometric Results 
The empirical results are summarized in tables 3.5 and 3.6. Table 3.5 presents OLS results 
for three different models. The simple model is without the technological and institutional 
variables, the extended model includes all and the reduced one excludes insignificant 
technological variables. 
In the simple model, all predictors are highly significant. Increasing returns to scale is a 
characteristic of production function in the manufacturing industries. The marginal product of 
capital is 0.279 and an elasticity of scale is 1.095. However, these parameters drop further once 
technological and institutional variables are in the extended model. Then we cannot reject 
constant return to scale and we obtain lower coefficients of capital and scale elasticities.  
In the extended model, technological variables have signs as expected except License and 
Training (which are, however, both insignificant). This seems surprising, but may be the case of 
manufacturing industries in Vietnam. Labor training activity is necessary to improve the 
productivity but not in the short run because it might reduce the amount of labor involved in the 
production process while firms have to face the deadline in completing their production 
contracts. Moreover, most of the Vietnamese manufacturing enterprises are processors with 
cheap labor, they are not under pressure to have the new but costly technology through licensing. 
Furthermore, some technological variables, such as Patent and Education of Top manager, do 
not have statistically significant coefficients. By contrast, Foreign, Education of employee, ISO 
certification and Internet are positive and significant. This suggests that knowledge through 
R&D and the educational level of top manager may not improve the firm productivity at least in 
the short run. The regression results confirm the case that foreign owned firms have a 
significantly higher productivity than firms without foreign ownership.
37
 We also show a 
positive impact of having internationally-recognized quality certificates on firm performance. 
Not surprisingly, the average educational level of workers and owning a website have positively 
significant effects on firm performance. 
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Long (2011) gives an empirical evidence that foreign firms increase their technical efficiency over time compared 
to domestic firms in Vietnam. 
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Table 3.5: Results of OLS regressions 
Dependent variable: 
Log value added per employee 
OLS Regressions 
Simple model Extended model Reduced model 
Traditional variables    
Log Labor 0.140 (0.039) *** -0.056 (0.050) -0.054 (0.047) 
Log (Capital/Labor) 0.279 (0.043) *** 0.229 (0.044) *** 0.215 (0.043) *** 
Capital Utilization 1.095(0.318) *** 1.023 (0.344) *** 0.972 (0.346) *** 
Technological variables    
Patent  0.177 (0.218)  
Foreign  0.643 (0.155) *** 0.601 (0.152) *** 
License  -0.125 (0.197)  
Education of employee  0.228 (0.110) ** 0.206 (0.109) * 
Education of top manager  0.151 (0.132)  
Training  -0.106 (0.123)  
ISO certification  0.317 (0.146) ** 0.322 (0.139) ** 
Internet  0.377 (0.119) *** 0.376 (0.117) *** 
Institutional variables    
Informal compete  -0.189 (0.110) * -0.175 (0.106) * 
Access to Finance  0.001 (0.114) -0.014 (0.113) 
Labor problem  -0.451 (0.236) ** -0.360 (0.185) * 
Governance  -0.043 (0.160) -0.048 (0.161) 
Constant 11.736 (.866) *** 13.059 (0.973) *** 13.436 (0.950) *** 
R-squared 0.22 0.29 0.28 
Number of observations 378 361 366 
Notes:  (1) ***, **, and * denote significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
          (2) Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
              (3) All regressions include industry and region fixed-effects. 
Institutional variables, on the contrary, have less influence on variations in firm 
productivity.
38
 Although all variables get expected signs, Accesses to Finance from formal 
financial institutions (i.e., banking system) and Governance do not have any significant impact 
on firm productivity. The common knowledge that external financing in Vietnam is mostly 
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This judgment is also confirmed by Long (2011) that medium and large manufacturing enterprises are less 
sensitive to investment climate obstacles in Vietnam. 
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limited to state-owned firms and is hard to obtain for the others.
39
 Furthermore, high collateral 
requirements as a percentage of the loan as well as complicated and long-lasting procedures 
prevent private enterprises from relying on bank to finance for working capital and investment 
purposes. These firms prefer informal financial systems to overcome their financing constraints. 
Also they try to reduce the need for loans through more efficient management. These reasons 
explain for the insignificant coefficient of the Accesses to Finance variable. The statistically 
insignificant coefficient of Governance variable is, however, still in doubt. Tran, Grafton, and 
Kompas (2009) find that improvement in government practice could increase the daily value-
added of an average firm in Vietnam. By contrast, the coefficients of Informal compete and 
Labor problem are negative and significant. These results, to some extent, are similar to the 
study of Hallward-Driemeier and Xu (2006) for Chinese manufacturing firms.
40
 It can be said 
that due to accelerating integration into the world economy and becoming an official member of 
WTO in early 2007, the investment climate and business environment of Vietnam have been 
improved to meet the new requirements (see Dordi et al., 2008; MPI, 2010). However, these 
improvements are not enough and synchronous (Dang, 2009). Hence, the impact of institutional 
factors on firm productivity should be considered carefully. 
Firms can face different conditions and cope with different problems at different levels of 
productivity. Technological activities may be organized differently in low- and high-productivity 
firms. Institutional problems affect firms in different ways depending on firm level productivity. 
Because the results from OLS regressions just give the average relationship between technology, 
institutions and productivity, we further apply the quantile regressions. This allows us to 
examine the differential impact of technology and institutions on firm productivity across three 
quartiles (25th, 50th, 75th) of the productivity distribution. Quantile methods are also preferred 
to least square estimation due to the higher degree of robustness in estimation as they are less 
sensitive to outlying observations.  To detect and correct for heteroscedasticity, we combine 
quantile regressions with bootstrap methods. 
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This issue is especially relevant in socialism-oriented nations, which have strong policies that favor the state 
sector. 
40
Hallward-Driemeier, Scott and Xu (2006) show that labor market flexibility weakly significant while there is no 
evidence that average access to finance affects firm performance. 
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Table 3.6: Results of Quantile Regressions 
Dependent variable: 
Log value added per employee 
Quantile Regressions 
Lower quartile Median Upper quartile 
Traditional variables    
Log Labor -0.084 (0.055) -0.057 (0.054) -0.116 (0.079) 
Log (Capital/Labor) 0.210 (0.059) *** 0.174 (0.051) *** 0.225 (0.056) *** 
Capital Utilization 0.659 (0.384) * 0.714 (0.397) * 0.716 (0.423) * 
Technological variables    
Foreign 0.490 (0.177) *** 0.532 (0.202) *** 0.910 (0.237) *** 
Education of employee 0.181 (0.128) 0.237 (0.129) * 0.195 (0.172) 
ISO certification 0.458 (0.156) *** 0.417 (0.156) *** 0.445 (0.189) ** 
Internet 0.428 (0.159) *** 0.406 (0.144) *** 0.368 (0.167) ** 
Institutional variables    
Informal compete -0.001 (0.145) -0.139 (0.134) -0.299 (0.164) * 
Access to Finance -0.115 (0.119) -0.039 (0.144) -0.093 (0.145) 
Labor problem 0.306 (0.254) -0.375 (0.216) * -0.923 (0.502) * 
Governance -0.290 (0.171) * -0.099 (0.262) 0.086 (0.204) 
Constant 13.132 (1.236) *** 14.358 (1.065) *** 14.323 (1.169) *** 
Pseudo R-squared 0.16 0.18 0.21 
Number of observations 366 366 366 
Notes:   (1) ***, **, and * denote significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
              (2) All regressions include industry and region fixed-effects. 
  (3) Bootstrap standard errors (with 100 replications) in parentheses. 
Table 3.6 presents results for the different quartiles of the distribution of firm productivity, 
namely the median regression, the lower and upper quartiles. Comparing the average and median 
firms, the size, sign and statistical significance of coefficients do not differ considerably.
41
 
However, the more interesting picture emerges by the different results for low- and high-
productivity firms. Both types of firms share the characteristic of constant returns to scale but the 
low-productivity firms have a lower marginal productivity of capital. Looking at the 
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We note that the above institutional variables may be endogenous as they could be affected by firm performance. 
We lack good instruments for these variables, however, the similar results of OLS and median regressions after 
controlling for industry and region fixed-effects and correcting for heteroscedasticity give evidence that our 
estimations might not be affected by endogeneity problem. 
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technological variables, the roles of foreign ownership, ISO certificate and owning a website are 
robust in different kinds of specifications, although the coefficient sizes differ. The differences 
between the low- and high-productivity firms are most prominently revealed through 
institutional variables. Practices of competitors in the informal sectors and the inadequately 
educated workforce hamper high-productivity firms while the obstacles caused by business 
licensing and permits, customs and trade regulation, tax rates and tax administration (i.e., 
governance) hurdle the performance of low-productivity firms.  
3.6 Conclusion 
Using a cross-section data set of Vietnamese manufacturing industries we investigate the 
productivity effects of technology and institutions. Our results show that the positive impacts of 
indirect technological factors such as foreign ownership, ISO certificate, owning a website and 
educational level of employee on firm productivity are robust to different types of specifications.  
Furthermore, there is no evidence that access to finance appears to affect firm performance and 
other institutional variables such as practices of competitors in the informal sectors, labor market 
issue (i.e., inadequately educated workforce), obstacles in policy and administration have 
different impacts depending on firm level productivity. The results also point out the problem of 
constant returns to scale in Vietnamese manufacturing industries and the limitations of 
innovative activities and training labor in firms. These findings are in line with the research of 
Goedhuys, Janz and Mohnen (2006), who argue that firm productivity differences are not only 
explained by differences in production factors or in technology, but also by the role of 
institutions.  
 The main policy conclusion from this analysis is that the effects of institutions on firm 
productivity can differ substantially across firm level productivity. We suggest that 
improvements in public governance quality, education reform oriented to practical knowledge 
and working skills that suit firm labor demand and effective competition in the marketplace can 
help to increase firm productive performance.  
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Appendix to Chapter 3 
Appendix 3.1: Results of OLS and Median Regressions 
 
Dependent variable: 
Log value added per employee 
 OLS Regressions                                      Median Regressions 
1 2 3 4 
Traditional variables     
Log Labor -0.029 (0.045) -0.054 (0.047) -0.044 (0.059) -0.057 (0.054) 
Log (Capital/Labor) 0.222 (0.042) *** 0.215 (0.043) *** 0.178 (0.056) *** 0.174 (0.051) *** 
Capital Utilization 0.955 (0.321) *** 0.972 (0.346) *** 0.883 (0.343) ** 0.714 (0.397) * 
Technological variables     
Foreign 0.621 (0.145) *** 0.601 (0.152) *** 0.568 (0.221) ** 0.532 (0.202) *** 
Education of employee 0.185 (0.109) * 0.206 (0.109) * 0.217 (0.134) * 0.237 (0.129) * 
ISO certification 0.328 (0.136) ** 0.322 (0.139) ** 0.469 (0.147) *** 0.417 (0.156) *** 
Internet 0.346 (0.114) *** 0.376 (0.117) *** 0.377 (0.148) ** 0.406 (0.144) *** 
Institutional variables     
Informal compete  -0.175 (0.106) *  -0.139 (0.134) 
Access to Finance  -0.014 (0.113)  -0.039 (0.144) 
Labor problem  -0.360 (0.185) *  -0.375 (0.216) * 
Governance  -0.048 (0.161)  -0.099 (0.262) 
Constant  13.436 (0.950) ***  14.358 (1.065) *** 
R-squared 0.28 0.28   
R-squared Pseudo    0.18 0.18 
Number of observations 376 366 376 366 
Notes:   (1) ***, **, and * denote significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
             (2) All regressions include industry and region fixed-effects. 
 (3) Robust standard errors in parentheses for OLS. 
 (4) Bootstrap standard errors (with 100 replications) in parentheses for median regressions. 
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4 Investment Climate and Technical Efficiency in Vietnamese 
Manufacturing 
 
ABSTRACT.
42
 This chapter identifies the constraints of the investment climate on Vietnamese 
manufacturing technical efficiency. The empirical results show that a good quality of 
infrastructure and finance, an investment-friendly and transparent environment, a safe society 
encourage firm technical efficiency. The impacts of the investment climate on firm technical 
inefficiency are robust to various kinds of specifications. The results highlight that foreign firms 
attain improvements in production efficiency over time compared to domestic firms. Also large 
firms as well as foreign firms get benefits from their exports in terms of technical efficiency. 
However, no strong evidence supports technical efficiency improvement in Vietnamese 
manufacturing firms after this country became an official WTO member in early 2007. 
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Long, P. D. (2011). Investment Climate and Technical Efficiency: Evidence from Vietnamese Manufacturing. 
Proceedings of the University of Mauritius and WTO Chairs Programme International Conference on International 
Trade and Investment, ISSN: 16941225, Mauritius. 
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4.1 Introduction 
In the literature, it is now well accepted that investment climate can significantly and 
adversely impact productivity, growth and economic activity. The investment climate is defined 
by the World Bank (2005) as “the set of location-specific factors shaping the opportunities and 
incentives for firms to invest productively, create jobs and expand.” Key factors affecting the 
investment climate are physical infrastructure, security, regulatory framework, access to finance, 
human capital, technological and innovation support, competition and property rights.  
A better investment climate improves bureaucratic performances and predictability, and 
contributes to the effective delivery of public goods that are necessary for productive business 
(The World Bank, 2004). Using the World Bank enterprise surveys data, Escribano and Guasch, 
(2005) for Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua; Kinda, Plane, and Véganzonès-Varoudakis 
(2009) for the Middle East and North Africa find clear evidence that the investment climate 
matters for firm performance.
43
 Interestingly, their findings come from different approaches. 
Escribano and Guasch study the influence of investment climate on productivity of the whole 
manufacturing in the three countries and then breakdown the data by country, size and age of 
firms, while Kinda, Plane, and Véganzonès-Varoudakis are in favour of industry specific 
technical efficiency impact of investment climate. 
There is a somewhat poorer literature on firm productive performance effects of investment 
climate in transition economies. Vietnam is an interesting case to analyze in this context. After a 
short period of over-excitement in the first time of WTO membership from the early 2007, 
Vietnam has worried about the overall economic situation. Recent achievements are lower than 
state’s potentials and capability. Economic growth quality, productivity, efficiency and 
competitiveness are low and improved slowly (Ninth Central Committee Conference, 2009). In 
fact, this country has suffered from negative impacts of global financial crisis and recession. 
GDP growth of the whole economy and GDP growth by economic sectors decreased, especially 
there was a tremendous decline of manufacturing. 
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Another related study is by Kinda (2010), who focuses on the relationship between investment climate and Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) in developing countries. She shows that constraints related to investment climate such as 
physical infrastructure problems, financing constraints, and institutional problem discourage FDI. 
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It has come to be widely agreed that the weaknesses of the economy and the manufacturing 
sector that became more serious in the context of global economic crisis could be overcome to 
large extents if the investment climate had not created obstacles to economic development 
(Vietnamese Business Forum Report, 2011). However, the empirical evidence on the constraints 
of the investment climate on the efficiency of Vietnamese enterprises is rather limited. For 
example, Nguyen and Nishijima (2009), using firm-level cross-section data set surveyed by the 
World Bank in Vietnam in 2005, find that obstacles in policy, administration and social 
environment hinder firms from increasing their intensity of exports, but not the cases of 
constraints from physical infrastructure and factor markets.  
Long (2012) investigates the productivity effects of technology and institutions, using a 
cross-sectional manufacturing firm-level data set derived from the World Bank survey in 
Vietnam in 2009. He documents that firm productivity differences are not only explained by 
differences in production factors or in technology, but also by the role of institutions. He finds no 
evidence of access to finance appears to affect firm performance and other institutional variables 
such as practices of competitors in the informal sectors, labor market issue (i.e., inadequately 
educated workforce), obstacles in policy and administration have different impacts depending on 
firm level productivity. 
As for studying the effects of the investment climate on firm efficiency, that to some extent, 
directly related to Vietnam, Kinda (2009) shows that foreign firms benefit from better investment 
climate, they are more efficient than domestic firms and firms (particularly small local firms) 
that sell more of their production to multinationals are more efficient.
44
  
Unlike the earlier studies use one-step stochastic frontier analysis with pooled data from 
developing countries, this paper applies a different econometric approach for a specific country 
to be able to identify the causal effects of investment climate on technical efficiency. We show 
that, for a particular country, time-varying inefficiency model for panel data is better than 
pooling data one-step stochastic frontier analysis in considering the whole manufacturing or 
industry specific technical efficiency impact of investment climate. Additionally, using the 
unique and latest data from the investment climate surveys of the World Bank in Vietnam in 
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This paper uses manufacturing firm data from the World Bank surveys in five developing countries (Brazil, 
Morocco, Pakistan South Africa, and Vietnam) in the mid-2000s. 
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2005 and 2009, it is possible to link our empirical work to the recent literature that has put the 
investment climate at the center of economic performance (see Kinda, Plane, and Véganzonès-
Varoudakis, 2011)) by providing more specific evidence. 
The suitable models and the quality of the data allow us to investigate the improvement of 
technical efficiency by industry and the whole Vietnamese manufacturing after three years 
deeper integration to the world economy. Moreover, we identify whether the effect of investment 
climate on firm efficiency is different depending on firm size, export status and ownership. To 
our knowledge, these have not been investigated in earlier studies.  
Previewing the empirical results we find, after controlling for the possible endogeneity of the 
investment climate variables and also controlling for firm specific characteristics, that the 
investment climate matters for firm performance. A good quality of infrastructure and finance, 
an investment-friendly and transparent environment, a safe society encourage firm technical 
efficiency. Some industries, more exposed to international competition, are more sensitive than 
others to investment climate deficiencies. Furthermore, the impacts of investment climate on 
firm technical inefficiency are robust to various kinds of specifications. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a context for the empirical 
analyses by reviewing the manufacturing and the impacts of investment climate on firm 
performance in this sector. Section 3 presents the literature review relating to the paper. Section 
4 and 5 lay down the main model to be used as framework for the empirical analyses and the 
data, variables construction. Section 6 discusses the main econometric results. Finally, the 
conclusion is presented in section 7.  
4.2 Manufacturing Sector and Investment Climate in Vietnam 
4.2.1 Manufacturing Sector 
Vietnam has been in the early stage of industrialization and modernization process with 
increasing importance of production activities in the economy. The manufacturing industries 
have occupied the largest share in the GDP growth compared with others. They made around 
32% of GDP growth for the periods 2001 – 2005 and 2006 – 2009. 
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Table 4.1: Contribution of Economic Sectors and Manufacturing to GDP Growth 
(in percentage of overall GDP growth) 
 1996 – 2000 2001 – 2005 2006 – 2009 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery 
Services 
Industry and Construction 
    + Manufacturing industries  
15.9 
35.0 
49.1 
27.2 
11.0 
37.9 
51.1 
31.7 
8.8 
44.7 
46.5 
31.9 
   Source: Nguyen and Pham, 2010 
However, the stagnancy in recent economic growth and the prolonged weak competitiveness 
of the economy indicates the limitations of manufacturing. They are low capital efficiency, labor 
productivity and value added, low employment creation relative to employment destruction in  
agriculture, heavy dependence on external markets for outputs and major inputs (Nguyen and 
Pham, 2010; MPI, 2010).  
Figure 4.1: GDP Growth by Economic Sectors and Manufacturing 
(in percentages 2004 - 2009) 
 
      Source: Ministry of Planning and Investment – MPI (2010). 
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The years 2007 – 2009 witnessed remarkable changes in Vietnam’s economic performance, 
from social issues to economic institutions. In the first three years of WTO membership and 
deeper integration to the world economy, the vulnerability to negative external shocks of the 
economy is more apparent. GDP growth of the whole economy and GDP growth by economic 
sectors decreased, especially there was an enormous decline of manufacturing from 12.37% in 
2007 to 2.76% in 2009 because of the global financial crisis and rising energy price.  
Different from other industries, Vietnamese manufacturing is mostly affected by 
international integration owing to its export-oriented characteristics. Manufacturing for domestic 
market was fiercely competed by foreign goods with decreasing import tax under WTO and 
others’ commitments. Meanwhile, manufacturing for export faced declined demands from 
foreign markets in the period. For example, compared to 2008, agriculture intensive industries 
(Food and Beverage) were influenced most seriously with the growth rate in 2009 declined 63%. 
The growth rate of capital intensive industries (Paper, Chemical, Plastics and Rubber, Non 
metallic mineral, Machinery and Equipment) was around a half and of labor intensive (Apparel 
and Leather, Textiles) was 40% decreased.  
The improvement in production effectiveness of manufacturing industries has not been as 
expected when Vietnam has engaged into regional and world economy. In general, 
manufacturing industries have not clearly improved the technology, diversified and raised value 
added for Vietnamese products despite increasingly competitive pressures from globalization 
(MPI, 2010).   
4.2.2 Investment Climate in Vietnam 
The weaknesses of the manufacturing sector that became more serious in the context of 
global economic crisis could be overcome to large extents if the investment climate had not 
created obstacles to economic development.  The Table 4.2 presents the scores of main indicators 
of Vietnam’s investment climate and shows up the limitations of its business environment. It 
highlines cases with rankings lower than the median of the sample countries.  
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Table 4.2: Ranking of Ease of Doing Business for Vietnam versus the Regional Average 
 2005 2009 
Vietnam 
(0ut of 181) 
Average (6) Vietnam 
(0ut of 175) 
Average (9) Average (6) 
Overall ranking  
Ranking for 10 factors 
   Starting a business 
   Dealing with licenses 
   Employing workers 
   Registering property 
   Getting credit 
   Protecting investors 
   Paying taxes 
  Trading across borders 
   Enforcing contracts 
   Closing a business 
 
98 
 
89 
28 
137 
30 
76 
170 
116 
68 
90 
105 
66 
 
75 
70 
81 
56 
50 
70 
75 
54 
71 
77 
92 
 
108 
67 
90 
37 
43 
170 
140 
67 
42 
124 
87 
 
106 
78 
78 
87 
75 
81 
74 
59 
89 
101 
66 
 
94 
62 
80 
57 
58 
61 
82 
34 
66 
86 
Source: Doing Business Database of World Bank, 2009 and Urata and Ando, 2009. 
Notes: Average ranking is calculated for a comparison among 10 factors. Average (9) shows average 
ranking for nine ASEAN economies (Brunei, Combodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam). Average (6) shows average ranking for six ASEAN economies that 
appear in both year (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam). 
The position of Vietnam in overall ranking is not improved in 2009 compared with that in 
2005. In particular, some items tend to be better such as getting credit, enforcing contracts while 
others are even worse. The most serious problems are in the areas of starting and closing a 
business, protecting investors, and paying taxes. Relating to trade activities, relative evaluations 
for trading across borders are improved from 54
th
 to 34
th
 on average in ASEAN 6 but seem not to 
be the case of Vietnam, 68
th
 out of 175 in 2005 and 67
th
 out of 181 in 2009. These may reveal the 
fact that Vietnam has not made use of the facilitation of international integration and trade 
liberalization in this period. 
Urata and Ando (2009) emphasize main striking problems of Vietnamese investment climate: 
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 Underdeveloped infrastructure, shortages of human resources, and insufficient investment 
incentives. 
 Non-transparency in policies and regulations relating to investment which are sudden 
and/or frequent changes without notification in advance. 
 Complicated and/or delayed procedures concerning doing business in the fields of 
implementing on establishment, taxation, custom clearance, firm entry and exit as well as 
inconsistent interpretation and implementation of various regulations. 
The following figure presents the biggest business environment obstacles as perceived by 
firms from the Enterprise Survey in Vietnam 2009. The first graph shows the top ten constraints 
in Vietnam versus the regional average (East Asia Pacific - EAP), the second presents the top 
three constraints broken down by different firm sizes. 
Figure 4.2: Business Environment Obstacles in Vietnam 
 
   Source: The World Bank Enterprise Survey – Vietnam Country Profile 2009 
The result from the survey indicates the main problems for firm performance such as getting 
credit, practices of competitors in the informal sector, infrastructure, workforce and economic 
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governance. These bottlenecks are reported as hindering manufacturing firms to operate 
efficiently. 
4.3 Technical In/Efficiency and Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
Productivity and efficiency are economic aspects of firm performance and have been 
frequently used interchangeably in the media. Coelli et al. (2005) present that productivity can be 
decomposed into three components: technical efficiency, scale economies, and technical level. 
The technical efficiency refers to the ability to avoid wastes, either by producing as much output 
as technology and input usage or by using as little input as required by technology and output 
production. Hence, the analysis of technical efficiency can be output-oriented or input-oriented. 
The output-oriented technical efficiency refers to a firm’s ability to obtain maximum output from 
a given amount of inputs, given the technology (Fried, Lovell, and Schmidt, 2008). According to 
this definition, the output-oriented technical inefficiency could be defined as a situation where it 
is possible for a firm, given the know-how, to produce a larger output from the same inputs 
without increasing the amount of other inputs.
45
  
Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) provide the main reason for using technical efficiency as 
opposed to other types of efficiency. Different from cost, revenue and profit efficiency, technical 
efficiency is a purely physical notion that can be measured without the information of price and 
the position of an appropriate behavioral objective on producers. 
Formally, the level of technical efficiency is measured by estimating the best practice 
efficient frontier based on a relevant sample of firms. Thus, the firms on the frontier are 
considered the best practice firms in the market and the efficiencies of others are measured in 
comparison to the efficient frontier. 
Kalijaran and Shand (1999) explain a basic approach to calculate technical efficiency 
                  TE = Actual output / Maximum possible ouput          (4.1) 
                                                          
45
Unless otherwise stated, the output-oriented technical inefficieny will be refered to as technical inefficiency for the 
reminder of the paper. 
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In this equation, the actual output is observable but maximum possible output is not and must 
be estimated. A ratio of one in the above equation means that the firm is technically efficient and 
operates on the production frontier. 
Farrell (1957) is the pioneer who firstly develops the technique to empirically measure the 
production frontier. He uses a linear programming method to obtain the production frontier that 
is called deterministic frontier. This method forms the basis of the Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) method by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978). In this deterministic approach, no 
account is taken of measurement errors and other sources of random noise. All deviations from 
the frontier are assumed to be the result of technical inefficiency (Coelli et al., 2005).  
The alternative to the DEA, the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), originated by Meeusen 
and van den Broeck (1977) and Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977), uses econometric methods to 
estimate the frontier. The SFA uses econometric techniques to estimate the error term of the 
production function that is split into two uncorrelated components, providing the basis for 
statistical inference. One is typical statistical noise which is a double-sided random error, which 
presents the external shocks to the firm. The other represents the technical inefficiency which is 
assumed to follow a one-sided distribution. In this approach, the factors that are beyond the 
control of management such as business environment or investment climate, socio-economic and 
demographic factors and other effects can be distinguished from inefficiency. This is the key 
reason why stochastic frontier approach is more relevant in the context of this study.  
4.4 Empirical Specifications 
Firm technical inefficiency can be explained by exogenous factors which affect either the 
technology of production or the firm ability to transform inputs into outputs (Kinda, Plane, and 
Véganzonès-Varoudakis, 2011). In the literature, these factors can be estimated in two different 
ways. A two-step procedure firstly estimates the stochastic production frontier and inefficiency 
without  exogenous variables, and then the estimated inefficiency is regressed against exogenous 
variables in the second step. However, Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) explain that there is 
inconsistency in the two-step approach because the second step regression is based on the biased 
estimated inefficiency from the first step. If the regression in the second step is not leant on true 
inefficiency then it is not meaningful to understand the determinants of variation in inefficiency. 
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There is another way suggesting to estimate using maximum likelihood techniques the 
production function frontier and the factors that explain technical inefficiency at the same time, 
called one-step stochastic frontier analysis. For this study, we follow one-step approach means 
that the parameters of the technical inefficiency and stochastic frontier model are jointly 
estimated but extend to the case of panel data assuming technical efficiency is time-varying.  
4.4.1 Time-varying Inefficiency Models for Panel Data 
According to Schmidt and Sickles (1984), there are three main difficulties concerning 
maximum likelihood methods and consistency of estimates from using cross-sectional data. First, 
firm technical inefficiency can be estimated inconsistently. Second, distributional assumptions of 
technical inefficiency are required. Third, it may be incorrect to assume that inefficiency is 
independent of the regressors. Each of these difficulties is potentially avoidable if a ‘satisfactory’ 
panel data set is available (Henderson, 2003).  
Coelli et al. (2005) present the three potential gains from using panel data to measure 
technical inefficiency. First, relaxing some of the strong distributional assumptions that are 
necessary to disentangle the separate effects of inefficiency and noise. Next, getting consistent 
predictions of technical efficiency. Finally, showing changes in technical efficiencies over time. 
For panel data models, it is common to classify different structures due to whether technical 
inefficiency is time-invariant or time-varying. For many industries the independence assumption 
is unrealistic, it is expected efficient firms to remain reasonably efficient from period to period, 
and that inefficient firms improve their efficient levels over time (Coelli et al., 2005). Therefore, 
we estimate the Time-varying Inefficiency Models and check whether the technical efficiency is 
improved after Vietnam joined in WTO. 
Consider a stochastic frontier analysis of panel data: 
SFA assumes that each firm potentially produces less than it might due to a degree of 
inefficiency. 
                                                              (4.2) 
Where            is the degree of efficiency for firm i and in the interval (0,1] and       presents 
factors explaining technical inefficiency such as investment climate (IC) and firm-specific 
characteristics (C).  
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Taking the natural log of both sides of (4.2), the general empirical equation in linear form 
that the parameters of the technical inefficiency and stochastic frontier model are jointly 
estimated can be written as follows:  
  ln      ln                                                                         (4.3) 
         where         n                n  ̅̅̅     n               
with 
     : Value added of the firm i in region r and sector s during year t 
 ,  : Parameters of the equation 
            : Production factors – Labor, Capital 
        : dummies for region, sector and year 
     : External shocks and assumed to be independently       
   distributed 
      : error term defined by the truncation of normal distribution with zero mean and  
  
variance 
Two different specifications of the technical inefficiency     (for simplicity,     is used 
instead of        term represent for time-invariant and time-varying technical inefficiency. In the 
time-invariant models,         with   
   
 
        
      
   
 
      
   and        are distributed 
independently of each other and the covariates in the model.  
The time-varying decay specifications allow the technical efficiency levels to change 
systematically over time. These type of models take the form: 
             where                     (see Battese and Coelli, 1992)              (4.4) 
Where    is the last period in the i-th panel,   is the decay parameter. When   = 0, the time-
varying model reduces to time-invariant; if   > 0, the degree of inefficiency decreases over time 
and vice versa for   < 0.  
A predictor of the technical efficiency for the i-th firm is defined as: 
       TE  E{        |       }  {
             ⁄
           ⁄
}    (     
 
 
  
 )                         
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with                    
  
 
  
      and           
and  (.) represents the distribution function of the standard Gaussian random variable. 
4.5 Data Descriptions and Variables 
4.5.1 Descriptions of Data 
The data are drawn from the enterprise surveys in Vietnam conducted by the World Bank in 
2005 and the period 2009 – 2010.46 These surveys collect the data on inputs and outputs, firm 
characteristics in the last fiscal year with retrospective basis (one to three years before), and as 
well as quantitative and qualitative indicators of the investment climate. They provide subjective 
evaluations of obstacles and other objective information of cost and productivity on the themes 
of infrastructure, human capital, governance, and finance.  
The database for estimating is an unbalanced panel of Vietnam in the period 2003 – 2004 and 
2008/2009. For the investment climate (IC) variables, observations are available for the years 
2004, 2008 and 2009 but not for 2003. In order to use as many observations as possible to benefit 
from the law of large numbers, it is able to assume that, unless there is a structural break, the IC 
variables do not change much from one year to the next. In fact, what can change from one year 
to the next is the reaction of the firm facing a certain investment climate, but that depends on the 
firm’s perceptions of the impact of investment climate and on the time required for firm to 
implement the corresponding adjustments (see Escribano and Guasch, 2005; Kinda, 2009). 
Under these hypotheses, it is possible to allow the coefficients of certain IC variables to change 
from one year to the next while maintaining the values of the IC variables constant during 2003 
and 2004. For analysis, we get 2,809 observations available. In this sample, enterprises come 
from 13 manufacturing industries in five regions Red River Delta, Central North, Mekong River 
Delta, Southern Central Coast, and South East. 
4.5.2 Variables Descriptions  
All variables are expressed in logarithms, except the ones that are expressed as a percent, and 
all nominal variables are deflated by the producer price index (PPI). The dependent variable 
                                                          
46
The Second World Bank Enterprise Surveys took place in Vietnam from June 2009 to January 2010. 
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(Value added) and two production function variables (Labor, Capital) are in Vietnam Dong 
(VND) and adjusted by PPI base year 2000. In accordance with the theory, firm characteristics 
such as Export, Foreign ownership, ISO certificate, Training employee, Manager’s experience, 
Capacity utilization, Internet access, and Working hours are included. The explanatory variables 
of interest – investment climate variables are distinguished into four categories: Infrastructure, 
Business-Government Relations, Crime and Legal Environment, Finance and Labor, depend on 
the context of Vietnam and available data from the two enterprise surveys. The quality of 
Infrastructure consists of four variables: Obstacle for the operation of the enterprise caused by 
Duration of power outages, Losses due to power outages, Electricity problem and Days to clear 
customs for imports. In fact, infrastructure deficiencies are considered as a burden for enterprise 
operations and investment (World Bank, 2004). Business-Government Relations are defined by 
six variables: Obstacle for the operation of the enterprise caused by Payments to deal with 
bureaucracy faster, Percentage of time spent dealing with regulations, Tax administration 
problem, Customs and Trade regulation problem, Permit problem and Corruption problem. 
Crime and Legal Environment are represented by three variables: Obstacle for the operation of 
the enterprise caused by Security cost, Crime problem, and Practices of competitors in informal 
sectors. These above reveal the capacity of the government to provide an investment-friendly 
and transparent environment and a safe society to the business sector. Finance and Labor include 
four variables: Obstacle for the operation of the enterprise caused by Access to finance, Loan, 
Labor regulation problem and Worker problem. Finance and human capital constitute essential 
factors of firm performance. Access to finance and the quality of educated workforce are always 
the main concerns of manufacturing in emerging economies.
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4.5.3 Endogeneity of the Investment Climate Variables 
One of the econometric problems that we have to face in estimating models above is the 
possible endogeneity of the IC variables due to the qualitative nature of investment climate 
factors (Kinda, Plane, and Véganzonès-Varoudakis, 2009). Following the methods presented by 
Escribano and Guasch (2005), the two complementary procedures are used to correct for the 
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See the Appendix for definition and construction of all variables used in this chapter. 
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endogeneity of the IC variables.
48
 First, the region-industry average of the firm level investment 
climate variables (  ̅) instead of the crude IC variables is created to reduce the degree of 
endogeneity of the IC variables. This also helps to mitigate the effect of missing IC observations 
for some firms. Then the investment climate perception variables are used together with IC 
variables.
49
 Furthermore, in some cases, we restrict the sample to the firms that are less likely to 
choose their location by excluding large firms or foreign ownership firms. 
4.5.4 Investment Climate Variables Selection 
The econometric methodology applied for the selection of the IC variables goes from the 
general to the specific (e.g., Escribano and Guasch, 2005). Starting from a general model with all 
variables (in Appendix 4.1 - Appendix 4.4) included at once, we then reduce this general model to 
a simple one with relevant (significant) variables. In the reduction process, we do not delete all 
insignificant variables at once. In detail, the less significant variables are eliminated one by one 
but to ensure the existence of at least one IC variable from each broad category (Infrastructure, 
Business-Gorvernment Relations, Crime and Legal Environment, Finance and Labor) for 
interpretive purposes. Then the final estimated model is efficiently estimated once insignificant 
or irrelevant variables are deleted. The estimated explanatory variables of the regression models 
of Table 4.4 to 4.7 are selected in this way. These regression results are consistent and allow 
interpreting the estimated coefficients and their signs with confidence. 
4.6 Empirical Results and Discussion 
We firstly estimate the stochastic production frontiers by industry to discover which sectors 
have technical inefficiency component. Next, using time-varying inefficiency models we 
                                                          
48
Enterprise surveys contain production function data for the last year and one to three years before. However, 
investment climate indicators refer to only one year. Hence, it is not possible to use the natural instruments like 
lagged IC variables as traditional instrumental variable approach. 
49The investment climate perception variables present firms’ feedbacks on obstacles they face for operation and 
growth, ranked from ‘no problem’ through ‘minor’, ‘moderate’, ‘major’ and ‘very severe’ problems. Endogeneity of 
the perception variables is also taken into account using region-sector average. These variables are weak instruments 
for IC variables in the best case. They are not highly correlated to IC variables.  
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consider what the impacts of investment climate are on these inefficiency sectors, and finally we 
provide further analyses and robustness checks.  
Table 4.3 presents the estimation results of the production frontier by industry. Unlike other 
manufacturing industries, the sum of the coefficients relative to labor and capital is just equal or 
less than one in Plastics and Rubber, Textiles. The two industries are probably the most exposed 
to the competition in the developing country like Vietnam.  
Furthermore, stochastic frontier analysis displays that eight out of thirteen industries get 
technical inefficiency. They are Apparel and Leather (A & L), Paper, Food, Textiles, Plastics and 
Rubber (P & R), Non Metallic Mineral Products (N M M), Machinery and Equipment (M & M), 
and Construction Materials (C M). 
The manufacturing sector is heterogeneous so that firms in the various industries could be 
affected differently by the same factors. Table 4.4 and 4.5 present the impacts of firm 
characteristics and investment climate on firm technical efficiency per each of eight inefficient 
industries that are indicated from Table 4.3. The parameters of the production functions are 
estimated jointly with the parameters of the investment climate and firm characteristic variables. 
However, to make the empirical results more readable we present them in separate tables. 
Table 4.4 shows that elasticities of capital and labor are different from each industry. 
Construction Material, Machinery and Equipment seem to be capital intensive industries. 
Meanwhile, Apparel and Leather, Paper, Food, Textiles, Non Metallic Mineral Products look 
like more intensive in labor. The results furthermore indicate that firm characteristics such as 
export activities, training employee, getting ISO certification and manager’s experience 
positively and significantly affect on firm technical efficiency. Apparel and Leather, the most 
labor intensive industry in the sample, improve its performance by training its workforce. Paper 
industry gets benefit from exporting and training its labor. Technical inefficiency in Textiles is 
decreased in enterprises that having ISO certificate and their managers get more years of 
working experience in the industry. Surprisingly, the experience of managers in Construction 
Material industry can hinder the improvement of firm efficiency.  
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Table 4.3: Technical Inefficiency by Industry 
 
 Dependent variable: Value added   
 Others Apparel 
& 
Leather 
Wood & 
Furniture 
Paper Food Textiles Garment Chemical Plastics 
& 
rubber 
Non 
metallic 
mineral 
Machinery 
& 
equipment 
Electronics Construction 
materials 
Capital .449*** 
(0.000)   
.446*** 
(0.000)   
.391*** 
(0.000)       
.409*** 
(0.000)       
.529*** 
(0.000)       
.484*** 
(0.000)       
.415*** 
(0.000)   
.388***  
(0.000)              
.575*** 
(0.000)   
.408*** 
(0.000)        
.573*** 
(0.000)   
.556***  
(0.000)      
.631*** 
(0.000)   
              
Labor .610*** 
(0.000)            
.667*** 
(0.000)       
.634*** 
(0.000)   
.610*** 
(0.000)       
.596*** 
(0.000)       
.528*** 
(0.000)       
.652*** 
(0.000)   
.854*** 
(0.000)       
.223***  
(0.000)      
.756*** 
(0.000)       
.505*** 
(0.000)       
.739**  
(0.001)       
.706*** 
(0.000)   
              
Intercept 8.24***              8.17*** 9.45***     10.76*** 7.82***     8.77***     8.63*** 9.15***     9.81***     9.41***       7.26***     6.41*       4.63*** 
              
H0: No 
inefficiency 
component 
.021 
(1.000) 
1.29*** 
(0.000) 
.009 
(1.000) 
1.421*** 
(0.005) 
1.66*** 
(0.000) 
1.50*** 
(0.006) 
.0203 
(1.000) 
.0354 
(1.000) 
3.03*** 
(0.000) 
2.64*** 
(0.017) 
.980*** 
(0.066) 
.863 
(0.368) 
1.340*** 
(0.025) 
Observations 230 188 254 121 433 204 74 137 148 88 192 46 174 
 
Notes:  (1) Estimated equation for Stochastic Production Frontiers by industry is as follows: 
                        ln       ln       ln                        
(2) p-value is reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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Table 4.4: Time-varying Inefficiency Models by Industry 
Dependent variable: Value added 
 C M A & L Paper Food Textiles P & R N M M M & E 
Capital 0.609*** 0.247*** 0.358*** 0.360*** 0.647*** 0.411*** 0.324** 0.506*** 
Labor 0.385** 0.830*** 0.546*** 0.633*** 0.571*** 0.480** 0.694*** 0.470*** 
Firm characteristic variables (regressed on firm technical inefficiency) 
Export -0.005  -0.02***   0.007 0.007 -0.001    
Training 0.020 -0.371* -0.530* 0.314  -0.332 0.270 -0.265    
Foreign -0.005   -0.005                 
ISO   -0.116 -0.541 -0.982** -0.018 0.779              
Manager’s exp 0.420*** -0.066  -0.029 -0.249*                
Hours  0.847    0.856 0.563 -1.055    
Mu 0.557 -1.114 -5.811 -10.003 -10.714 -12.549 -2.535 3.124*   
Eta 0.059 -0.118* 0.009 -0.049 -0.022 0.416*** -0.024 -0.096    
Observations 131 152 62 113 113 72 65 135    
Notes: (1) ***, **, and * denote significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  
           (2) Intercept included                                       
The results from Table 4.5 confirm that investment climate deficiencies harm firm 
performance. Unfortunately, these are true for all aspects of the investment climate but quite 
different from each industry. All of the inefficient industries face obstacles from security cost 
and crime problem except Non Metallic Mineral Products. In some industries, for example: 
Construction Material, Food, Textiles, most constraints of investment climate just come from 
these issues. Machinery and Equipments, Plastics and Rubber are more sensitive to investment 
climate constraints than the others. The obstacles from duration of power outages, security cost 
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and especially the problem of corruption hurdle the firm performance in Machinery and 
Equipment industry. The business efficiency of Plastics and Rubber is reduced by constraints 
from payments to speed up bureaucratic issues, cost of security and inadequately educated 
workforce. Meanwhile, Paper and Non Metallic Mineral Products are mainly influenced by 
defeciencies in the quality of infrastructure (losses due to the power outages and days to clear 
customs for imports).  
Comparing with the econometric results from pooling data SFA, evidences from time-
varying inefficiency models for panel data are better in terms of expected signs and statistical 
significance of coefficients.
50
 Furthermore, information on the change of technical efficiency 
from time-varying inefficiency model could tell something about the concerned problem: there is 
a little improvement or evenly decreased in technical efficiency in some manufacturing 
industries after three years WTO membership. 
  
                                                          
50
We have considered the pooled SFA. However, the results are not reliable despite bootstrapping and controlling 
for heteroskedasticity. The results are reported in Appendix 4.6. 
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Table 4.5: Investment Climate and Technical Inefficiency by Industry 
 C M A & L Paper Food Textiles P & R N M M M & E 
Infrastructure 
Losses power -0.303 -0.003 -2.714 0.026  -0.221 0.536* 0.164    
Power outages   1.984**     0.976*   
Electricity problem     5.088                
Custom clearance 1.458 -0.077 2.407** -0.549 -5.690  1.213* -1.175    
Business-Government 
Regulation dealing  -0.131 -0.067 -0.146 0.034 0.141 -0.416              
Bureaucracy faster -1.010 0.545** 0.392  -0.488 1.209** -5.761 0.524    
Corruption problem     3.410   4.512*   
Crime and Legal 
Crime   0.056 1.471** 0.834* 0.847 0.098 0.347    
Security 0.185** 0.167** 0.431*** 0.240*** -0.038 0.331***  0.202*   
Informal practices    0.353                 
Finance and Labor 
Finance access pro    -0.453  -0.744               
Worker problem      2.187**               
  Notes: (1) Investment climate variables are regressed on firm technical inefficiency. 
(2) ***, **, and * denote significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 
              (3) Excluding large firms in Food industry.             
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Further analyses  
Our former regressions confirm the choice of estimating the time-varing inefficiency models 
by industry. They are random effects time-varying inefficiency models because our estimates 
may be unreliable if fixed-effects models are used when the number of enterprises in each 
industry is small (Coelli et al., 2005). For further analyses and robustness checks of firm 
technical efficiency impact of investment climate, we estimate these models for the whole 
manufacturing with sector, time, and region fixed-effects. The fixed-effects models can be 
estimated in a standard regression framework using dummy variables.  
For all firms in the manufacturing industries, in general, it seems that investment climate 
obstacles but not firm characteristics affect on firm technical efficiency.  The results from pooled 
SFA and unbalanced panel are not so different but less statistically significant information 
provided than from balanced panel. They show up the obstacles caused by security cost and 
access to finance. Interestingly, most constraints of investment climate appear significantly in the 
observations of balanced panel model, except finance access. These might be come from the fact 
that the firms have more time operating in the industry so are easier to get access to credit. Their 
main concerns are number of days to clear customs for imports, payments to speed up 
bureaucracy issues and especially the practices of competitors in the informal sectors.   
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Table 4.6: Pooled and Panel Data Models for Manufacturing Industries 
Dependent variable: Value added 
 Pooled  SFA Unbalanced panel Balanced panel 
Capital 0.356*** 0.350*** 0.469*** 
Labor 0.532*** 0.572*** 0.529*** 
Firm characteristics    
Export 0.004* 0.003 -0.002    
Training -0.080 -0.047 -0.235    
Manager’s Exp -0.046 -0.057 0.077    
Hours -0.359 -0.252 -0.245 
Investment climate    
Losses power -0.029 -0.024 -0.020    
Power outages 0.010 0.099 -0.052    
Electricity problem 0.115 0.113 -0.532*   
Custom clearance 0.185 0.209 0.521**  
Regulation dealing 0.012 0.022 0.074    
Bureaucracy faster 0.072 -0.016 0.306**  
Crime 0.122 0.115 -0.128    
Security 0.184*** 0.192*** 0.192*** 
Informal practices pro -0.203 -0.184 0.628*** 
Finance access problem 0.511** 0.560* -0.228    
Mu  5.002 -4.397    
Eta  -0.040 0.054    
Observations 588 589 387    
Notes:  (1) ***, **, and * denote significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
            (2) Regressions include intercept, region, sector and year dummies 
(3) Excluding large foreign firms in Pooled SFA and Unbalanced Panel due to 
heteroskedasticity 
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Breakdown by size and ownership 
The breakdown by size and ownership allow testing for the robustness of impacts of firm 
characteristics and investment climate constraints on firm efficiency.  
Considering the breakdown by firm size, the results in Table 4.7 show that most coefficients 
with expected signs are statistically significant. Large firms get benefits from exporting, 
meanwhile the practices of competitors in informal sectors, the security cost, and the days to 
clear customs for imports hinder their performance. The investment climate obstacles from 
business-government relations seem not to significantly hurdle them. However, the pictures of 
small firms are very different. Their business efficiency is harmed by government regulations, 
power outages, and finance access. However, it is useful in terms of public governance, to take 
into account that the operations of informal sectors increase their technical efficiency. It might 
come from the fact that business law has still not functioned properly (Vo and Nguyen, 2009). 
Interestingly, compared to small and large firms, medium enterprises are the least sensitive to 
investment climate obstacles. Their technical efficiency is negatively affected by security cost 
and power outages. 
The Table 4.7 also presents the classification by firm ownership. Foreign ownership firms are 
less influenced by investment climate constraints than local firms. Their performance is only 
affected by security problems (crime, expenditure on security), while investment climate 
obstacles caused by Business-Government relations (proxied by payments to deal with 
bureaucracy ‘faster’) and security cost significantly worsen domestic firms in term of technical 
efficiency. In fact, foreign firms have more power in lobbying policy makers and attracting high 
qualified workers. 
Moreover, from the empirical results, exporting of foreign firms significantly improves their 
technical efficiency and especially, foreign firms increase their technical efficiency over time of 
period study.  
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Table 4.7: Time-varying Inefficiency Models by Size and Ownership 
Dependent variable: Value added 
 Size Ownership 
 Small Medium Large Foreign Domestic  
Capital 0.336*** 0.377*** 0.402*** 0.343*** 0.373*** 
Labor 0.587 0.638*** 0.520*** 0.521*** 0.664*** 
Firm characteristics      
Export 0.002 0.004 -0.003*** -0.007*** -0.002    
Hours -1.778*** 0.002 -0.181 0.404 -0.327*   
Investment climate      
Losses power 0.047 -0.058 -0.036 -0.079 -0.035    
Power outages 0.673** 0.274** -0.079 -0.234 0.009    
Electricity problem 1.526** 0.454 -0.091 -0.315 0.118 
Custom clearance 0.330 0.182 0.269* 0.312 0.173 
Regulation dealing 0.235*** -0.050 0.018 -0.048 -0.009    
Bureaucracy faster -0.474 -0.036 0.046 -0.174 0.141*   
Crime -0.247 0.154 -0.128 0.464* 0.106    
Security 0.236** 0.202*** 0.188*** 0.179*** 0.193*** 
Informal Practices -0.815** -0.167 0.332*** -0.220 0.049    
Finance access pro 1.404*** 0.370 -0.595*** 0.083 -0.123    
mu 0.329 2.784*** 2.857*** -1.379 4.830    
eta 0.121 0.029 0.033 0.167*** -0.047    
Observations 89 504 887 185 1348    
Notes:  (1) ***, **, and * denote significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
(2) Regressions include intercept, region, sector and year dummies. For small firms, only 
sector dummy due to few observations. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
 
Using time-varying inefficiency models for the World Bank Investment Climate surveys in 
2005 and 2009, this is the first paper that identifies the constraints of investment climate on 
Vietnamese manufacturing firm technical efficiency. The results empirically show that a good 
quality of infrastructure and finance, an investment-friendly and transparent environment, a safe 
society encourage firm technical efficiency. The impacts of investment climate on firm technical 
inefficiency are robust to various kinds of specifications. Security problem emerges as the most 
popular constraint. Some industries such as Machinery and Equipments, Plastics and Rubber are 
more sensitive than others to investment climate deficiencies. These are also the cases of small 
firms and domestic-owned enterprises. 
The results also highlight that foreign firms attain improvement in production efficiency over 
time compared to domestic firms. In addition, large firms as well as foreign firms get benefit 
from their export in term of technical efficiency. This finding is in line with the study of Le 
(2010), who evidences that exporting has no significant influence on the technical efficiency of 
Vietnamese domestic manufacturing SMEs. Remarkably, we find no strong evidence supports 
for technical efficiency improvement in Vietnamese firms after this country became an official 
WTO member in early 2007. 
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Appendix to Chapter 4 
Appendix 4.1: General Information at Plant Level and Production Function Variables 
 
Appendix 4.2: Firm Characteristic Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
Training dummy variable =1 if the plant provides training to its 
employees  
than on the job Export Percentage of the establishment's sales were exported 
directly 
Foreign ownership Percentage of firmed is owned by foreign private 
Manager’s  experience Top Manager’s years of working experience  
Working hours Hours per week normally operate 
 ISO certification Firm has ISO Quality certification 
 Capacity utilization percentage of capacity utilized 
 Internet access dummy  variable = 1  if  the  plant  has  used  email  or  a  
website  in  its interactions with clients or suppliers. 
 
 
General 
Information at 
Plant Level 
Industrial 
classification 
Other manufacturing, Apparel & Leather products, Wood & 
wood products, incl. furniture, Paper, Food, Textiles, 
Garments, Chemicals, Plastics & rubber, Non metallic 
mineral products, Basic metals & Fabricated metal products, 
Machinery and equipment, Electronics, Construction 
materials 
Regional 
classification 
Red River Delta, Central North, Mekong River Delta, 
Southern Central Costal, South East 
  
 
 
 
Production 
Function 
Variables 
Sales Used as the measure of output for the production function 
estimation (in VND adjusted by PPI - base year 2000)  
Value added Value of total sales minus costs of raw materials and energy 
(in VND adjusted by PPI - base year 2000) 
Employment Total number of workers. 
Capital stock Book value of all fixed assets (in VND adjusted by PPI - base 
year 2000) 
Labor cost Total expenditures on personnel (in VND adjusted by PPI - 
base year 2000) 
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Appendix 4.3: Investment Climate Variables 
 
 
Infrastructure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Infrastructure 
Duration of power 
outages 
Average duration of power outages suffered by the plant in 
hours. 
Losses  due  to  power 
outages 
Value  of  the  losses  due  to  the  power  outages  as  a  
percentage  of  sales 
 Days  to  clear 
customs for imports 
Average  number  of  days  that  it  took  from  the  time  the  
plant’s  imports arrived to the point of entry until the time the 
plant could claim them from customs. 
 
Business-
Government 
Relations 
Percentage  of  time  
spent dealing with 
regulation 
Percentage  of  time  in  a  typical week  spent  by  
management  dealing  with bureaucracy/regulation. 
Payments    to    deal    
with bureaucracy faster 
Payments to “speed up” bureaucratic issues as a percentage of 
sales. 
 Finance 
 
 
Finance 
Loan Dummy variable = 1 if the plant reports that it has a bank loan. 
 Crime Security cost  
 
Expenditure on security related items by the plant as 
percentage of sales.  
 Appendix 4.4: Investment Climate Perception Variables 
Infrastructure 
 
Infrastructure 
Electricity problem Ranking  by  the  plant  of  electricity  as  a  problem  for  its  
operations and growth. 
Business-
Government 
Relations 
Tax administration Ranking by the plant of tax administration as a problem for its 
operations. 
 
and growth. 
Customs and Trade 
regulation 
problem 
Ranking by the plant of trade regulation as a problem for its 
operations. 
and growth. Permit problem Ranking by the plant of permit and business registration as a 
problem for its operations and growth. 
Corruption problem Ranking  by  the  plant  of  corruption  as a  problem  for  its  
operations and growth. 
Crime and Legal 
Environment 
Crime problem Ranking by the plant of crime a problem for its operations and 
growth. 
Competitor problem Ranking by plant of practices of competitors in the informal 
sector as a problem for its operation and growth 
Finance and 
Labor 
Finance problem Ranking by the plant of access to finance as a problem for its 
operations and growth 
Labor regulation 
problem 
Ranking by the plant of labor regulation as a problem for its 
operations and growth. 
Worker problem Ranking by plant of inadequately educated workforce as a 
problem for its operations and growth. 
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Table 4.5: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Value Added 2658     21.38826      2.09466    3.019989    29.88232 
Capital 2713 22.23961 1.803433 15.63505 28.55724 
Labor 2804 4.77031 1.41935 1.386294 9.854665 
Export 2792 23.534 37.77589 0 100 
Training 2741 .557096 .49682 0 1 
Foreign 2797 10.20096 28.67406 0 100 
ISO 2796 .3040057 .4600673 0 1 
Manager’s Experience 2775 2.211941 .9374563 0 3.912023 
Hours 2793 3.950063 .2963782 0 5.123964 
Losses power 2743 2.462224 2.261494 0 20 
Power outages 2785 1.866987 .5687915 0 3.178054 
Electricity problem 2780 .1584188 .3224831 -1.386294 1.386294 
Custom clearance 2644 1.545028 .6624939 0 4.317488 
Regulation dealing 2801 5.878051 2.537081 0 15 
Bureaucracy faster 2783 .8687847 .7756454 0 3.466667 
Corruption problem 2701 -.3403969 .6352285 -2.302585 1.098612 
Crime 2809 0.884656 .319493 0 1 
Security 1881 17.34241 1.943248 13.68098 27.14878 
Informal practices problem 2747 -.3352814 .5979747 -2.302585 1.098612 
Finance access problem 2750 .4361072 .4345911 -1.386294 1.386294 
Worker problem 2776 .1990673 .4015042 -1.94591 1.386294 
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Appendix 4.6: Pooled Data SFA by Industry 
Dependent variable: Value added 
 C M A & L Paper Food Textiles P & R N M M M & E 
Capital 0.650*** 0.279*** 0.246*** 0.363*** 0.690*** 0.152 0.313**    0.606*** 
Labor 0.405** 0.859*** 0.401*** 0.531*** 0.473*** 0.245 0.692*** 0.417*** 
Firm characteristic variables  
Export -0.004  -0.018***   0.005 0.007 -0.004 
Training -0.009 -0.120 -0.561*** 0.290  0.502 0.344 -0.301 
Foreign -0.004   -0.004                 
ISO   -0.045*** -0.417 -0.640** 0.157 0.795              
Manager’s Exp 0.375** -0.031  0.011 -0.244**                
Hours  0.582 1.745***   0.101 0.553 -0.998* 
Investment climate variables 
Losses power -0.060 -0.076 -1.494*** 0.101  -0.551 0.509* 0.008 
Power outages   0.193***     0.299 
Electricity problem     2.673                
Custom clearance 0.723 -0.017 0.956*** -0.590 -3.571  1.152* 0.001 
Regulation dealing  -0.126 -0.081*** -0.112 0.015 -0.138 -0.417              
Bureaucracy faster -0.452 0.356* -0.082***  -0.153 2.540 -5.627 -0.191 
Corruption problem     1.588   1.373 
Crime   -0.637*** 1.164** 0.475 0.741 0.107 0.319 
Security 0.139** 0.132* 0.389*** 0.253*** -0.016 0.342**  0.162* 
Informal practices    0.192                 
Finance access pro    -0.099  0.184               
Worker problem      1.685**               
lnsig2v -0.688 -0.97*** -35.252 -0.558** -1.15*** -33.584 0.368 -0.585 
lnsig2u -0.623 -0.604** -0.340 -0.586 0.162 0.347 -0.226 -0.524 
Observations 131 152 60 113 113 72 65 135    
Notes:   (1) ***, **, and * denote significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively 
             (2) Excluding large firms in Food industry. Considering Paper industry only in two years 03 – 04. 
             (3) Firm’s characteristic and investment climate variables are regressed on firm technical inefficiency. 
             (4) Intercept included.                                       
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5 Conclusion 
5.1 Summary of Results 
In reality, what we can observe from the episode of trade liberalization is that Vietnam’s 
vulnerability to negative shocks has become increasingly apparent (Vo and Nguyen, 2009). After 
a short period of over-excitement in early stages of WTO membership from early 2007, Vietnam 
has worried about the overall economic situation. GDP growth of the whole economy and by 
economic sectors has decreased from the time of global financial crisis in 2008. Therefore, the 
implementation of international and regional trade commitments has raised concerns associated 
with the labor market adjustments and firm productive performance effects of trade policy 
reforms in Vietnam. 
This dissertation focuses on the impact of trade liberalization and institutions on labor market 
and firm productivity. The study commences (chapter 2) by highlighting the negative effect of 
trade liberalization on employment and wages in Vietnamese manufacturing, although this 
impact is moderate. In itself, this may have accounted for a 2.4% - 3.5% decline in real wages on 
average, and only a minor decline in employment. Furthermore, we find evidence of gender and 
skill earning inequalities in Vietnamese manufacturing, however these gaps decrease under trade 
liberalization. Additionally, trade unions and collective agreements seem to reduce the skill 
earning differentials, when taking into account the influence of unions by region.  
In chapter 3, we investigate the effects of technology and institutions on firm productivity, 
using a cross-section dataset. Interestingly, rather than R&D activities, indirect technology 
factors such as foreign ownership, ISO certificate and owning a website have a positive impact 
on firm performance. Additionally, there is no evidence that access to finance appears to affect 
firm performance, and other institutional variables such as competitors’ practices in the informal 
sectors, labor market issues (i.e. inadequately educated workforce), plus obstacles in policy and 
administration have different impacts, depending on firm level productivity. The results also 
indicate the problem of constant returns to scale in Vietnamese manufacturing industries and the 
limitations of innovative activities and training labor within firms.  
Chapter 4 deepens the analysis of chapter 3 in considering the role of the investment climate 
(the quality of institutions) on firm productive performance. We try to identify the constraints of 
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investment climate on Vietnamese manufacturing firm technical efficiency, with the empirical 
results suggesting that a good quality of infrastructure and finance, an investment-friendly and 
transparent environment, and a safe society encourage firm technical efficiency, with the security 
problem emerging as the most popular constraint. Some industries, such as Machinery and 
Equipment, Plastics and Rubber or small firms and domestic-owned enterprises are more 
sensitive to investment climate deficiencies than others. The results further indicate that foreign 
firms attain improvement in production efficiency over time, compared to domestic firms. 
Furthermore, both large and foreign firms gain benefit from their exports in term of technical 
efficiency. Remarkably, we do not find strong evidence in support of technical efficiency 
improvement in Vietnamese firms after the country became an official WTO member in early 
2007. 
5.2 Policy Implications and Future Research 
Overall, we should not adopt a negative perspective on the response of the labor market to 
trade openness in the case of Vietnam. Rather than fearing the negative effect of trade 
liberalization on employment and wages, Vietnam should enhance policies to protect unskilled 
or female workers by upgrading education and training levels, strengthening the role of trade 
unions in firms, increasing the number of unionized private sector firms with collective 
agreements, or launching policies to help enterprises improve their productivity in order to share 
more rents to workers and create more jobs.  
Additionally, this study finds that the effects of institutions and the investment climate on 
firm productivity substantially differ across firm level productivity and sectors. We further 
suggest that improvements in public governance quality, education reform oriented to practical 
knowledge and working skills suiting firm labor demand and effective competition in the 
marketplace can help to increase firm productive performance. 
Openness to the world economy is the opportunity for Vietnam to look back upon its chosen 
way, hopefully bringing significant benefits to the majority of Vietnamese citizens. Institutional 
reforms oriented to the greater predictability, security and transparency of market access for all 
economic sectors (public and private) is a prerequisite to build the foundations of greater 
prosperity and consolidate the achievements to date. 
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There has recently been a promising stream of research on Vietnamese manufacturing uses 
matched employer-employee data that has allowed for disentangling worker and firm 
heterogeneity by controlling for firm and worker characteristics (e.g., Larsen, Rand, and Torm, 
2011, and Torm, 2012). Thus, future research can apply this kind of data to analyze the economic 
and social impact assessment from Vietnam’s deeper integration into the global economy on the 
labor market, firm performance and worker income inequalities. 
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